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ABSTRACT
For more than sixty years, “obviousness” has set the bar for patentability.  Under this standard, 
if a hypothetical “person having ordinary skill in the art” would find an invention obvious in 
light of existing relevant information, then the invention cannot be patented.  This skilled person 
is defined as a non-innovative worker with a limited knowledge-base.  The more creative and 
informed the skilled person, the more likely an invention will be considered obvious.  The standard 
has evolved since its introduction, and it is now on the verge of an evolutionary leap: Inventive 
machines are increasingly being used in research, and once the use of such machines becomes 
standard, the person skilled in the art should be a person using an inventive machine, or just an 
inventive machine.  Unlike the skilled person, the inventive machine is capable of innovation and 
considering the entire universe of prior art.  As inventive machines continue to improve, this will 
increasingly raise the bar to patentability, eventually rendering innovative activities obvious.  The 
end of obviousness means the end of patents, at least as they are now.
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INTRODUCTION 
For at least two decades, machines have been autonomously generating 
patentable inventions.1  “Autonomously” here refers to the machine, rather than 
to a person, meeting traditional inventorship criteria.  In other words, if the 
“inventive machine” were a natural person, it would qualify as a patent inventor.  
In fact, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or Patent Office) may 
have granted patents for inventions autonomously generated by computers as 
early as 1998.2  In earlier articles, I examined instances of autonomous machine 
invention in detail and argued that such machines ought to be legally recognized 
as patent inventors to incentivize innovation and promote fairness.3  The owners 
of such machines would be the owners of their inventions.4  In those works, as 
here, terms such as “computers” and “machines” are used interchangeably to 
refer to computer programs or software rather than to physical devices or 
hardware.5 
This Article focuses on a related phenomenon: What happens when 
inventive machines become a standard part of the inventive process?  This is not 
a thought experiment.6  For instance, while the timeline is controversial, surveys 
of experts suggest that artificial general intelligence, which is a computer able to 
perform any intellectual task a person could, will develop in the next twenty-five 
years.7  Some thought leaders, such as Ray Kurzweil, one of Google’s Directors of 
 
1. See Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent 
Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1083–91 (2016) [hereinafter I Think] (describing instances of 
“computational invention” or “computer-generated works”); see also infra Subpart II.B 
(discussing some such instances in greater detail). 
2. Abbott, supra note 1, at 1085. 
3. Id. at 1083–91; Ryan Abbott, Hal the Inventor: Big Data and Its Use by Artificial Intelligence, 
in BIG DATA IS NOT A MONOLITH (Cassidy R. Sugimoto, Hamid R. Ekbia & Michael Mattioli 
eds.,2016) [hereinafter Hal the Inventor] (discussing computational invention in a book 
chapter first posted online February 19, 2015). 
4. Except where no owner exists, in possible cases of some open-source or distributed software, 
in which case ownership could vest in a user. 
5. Except perhaps in exceptional cases where software does not function on a general-purpose 
machine, and where specialized hardware is required for the software’s function. 
6. The growing prevalence and sophistication of artificial intelligence is accelerating the use of 
inventive machines in research and development.  See Ryan Abbott & Bret Bogenschneider, 
Should Robots Pay Taxes?  Tax Policy in the Age of Automation, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 145 
(2018) [hereinafter Should Robots Pay Taxes?] (discussing the trend toward automation). 
7. See generally Vincent C. Müller & Nick Bostrom, Future Progress in Artificial Intelligence: A 
Survey of Expert Opinion, in FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 553 (Vincent 
C. Müller ed., 2016). 
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Engineering, predict computers will have human levels of intelligence in about a 
decade.8 
The impact of the widespread use of inventive machines will be 
tremendous, not just on innovation, but also on patent law.9  Right now, 
patentability is determined based on what a hypothetical, non-inventive, skilled 
person would find obvious.10  The skilled person represents the average worker 
in the scientific field of an invention.11  Once the average worker uses inventive 
machines, or inventive machines replace the average worker, then inventive 
activity will be normal instead of exceptional. 
If the skilled person standard fails to evolve accordingly, this will result in 
too lenient a standard for patentability.  Patents have significant anticompetitive 
costs, and allowing the average worker to routinely patent their outputs would 
cause social harm.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has articulated, “[g]ranting patent 
protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real 
innovation retards progress and may . . . deprive prior inventions of their value 
or utility.”12 
The skilled standard must keep pace with real world conditions.  In fact, the 
standard needs updating even before inventive machines are commonplace.  
Already, computers are widely facilitating research and assisting with invention.  
For instance, computers may perform literature searches, data analysis, and 
pattern recognition.13  This makes current workers more knowledgeable and 
creative than they would be without the use of such technologies.  The Federal 
Circuit has provided a list of nonexhaustive factors to consider in determining 
the level of ordinary skill: (1) “type[s] of problems encountered in the art,” (2) 
“prior art solutions to those problems,” (3) “rapidity with which innovations are 
made,” (4) “sophistication of the technology,” and (5) “educational level of active 
 
8. Peter Rejcek, Can Futurists Predict the Year of the Singularity?, SINGULARITY HUB (Mar. 31, 
2017), https://singularityhub.com/2017/03/31/can-futurists-predict-the-year-of-the-singularity 
[https://perma.cc/4TDE-QQTW] (predicting artificial general intelligence in 2029). 
9. See, e.g., ROBERT PLOTKIN, THE GENIE IN THE MACHINE: HOW COMPUTER-AUTOMATED 
INVENTING IS REVOLUTIONIZING LAW & BUSINESS 60 (2009) (arguing that “[a]rtificial 
invention technology . . . enables [users] to produce inventions that they could not have 
created at all without such technology”); Ben Hattenbach & Joshua Glucoft, Patents in an 
Era of Infinite Monkeys and Artificial Intelligence, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 32, 44 n.70 (2015); 
Brenda M. Simon, The Implications of Technological Advancement for Obviousness, 19 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 331 (2013).  
10. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).  The “person having ordinary skill in the art” may be abbreviated 
as “PHOSITA” or simply the skilled person. 
11. See infra Subpart I.D. 
12. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402 (2007). 
13. Such contributions when made by other persons do not generally rise to the level of 
inventorship, but they assist with reduction to practice. 
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workers in the field.”14  This test should be modified to include a sixth factor: (6) 
“technologies used by active workers.” 
This change will more explicitly take into account the fact that machines are 
already augmenting the capabilities of workers, in essence making more obvious 
and expanding the scope of prior art.  Once inventive machines become the 
standard means of research in a field, the test would also encompass the routine 
use of inventive machines by skilled persons.  Taken a step further, once 
inventive machines become the standard means of research in a field, the skilled 
person should be an inventive machine.  Specifically, the skilled person should 
be an inventive machine when the standard approach to research in a field or 
with respect to a particular problem is to use an inventive machine (the 
“Inventive Machine Standard”).  
To obtain the necessary information to implement this test, the Patent 
Office should establish a new requirement for applicants to disclose when a 
machine contributes to the conception of an invention, which is the standard for 
qualifying as an inventor.  Applicants are already required to disclose all human 
inventors, and failure to do so can render a patent invalid or unenforceable.  
Similarly, applicants should need to disclose whether a machine has done the 
work of a human inventor.  This information could be aggregated to determine 
whether most invention in a field is performed by people or machines.  This 
information would also be useful for determining appropriate inventorship, and 
more broadly for formulating innovation policies. 
Whether the Inventive Machine Standard is that of a skilled person using 
an inventive machine or just an inventive machine, the result will be the same: 
The average worker will be capable of inventive activity.  Conceptualizing the 
skilled person as using an inventive machine might be administratively simpler, 
but replacing the skilled person with the inventive machine would be preferable 
because it emphasizes that the machine is engaging in inventive activity, rather 
than the human worker. 
Yet simply substituting an inventive machine for a skilled person might 
exacerbate existing problems with the nonobviousness inquiry.  With the 
current skilled person standard, decisionmakers, in hindsight, need to reason 
about what another person would have found obvious.15  This results in 
 
14. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
15. See generally Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the 
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006) (discussing 
problems with hindsight in non-obviousness inquiries). 
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inconsistent and unpredictable nonobviousness determinations.16  In practice, 
the skilled person standard bears unfortunate similarities to the “Elephant 
Test,”17 or Justice Stewart’s famously unworkable definition of obscene material: 
“I know it when I see it.”18  This may be even more problematic in the case of 
inventive machines, as it is likely to be difficult for human decisionmakers to 
theoretically reason about what a machine would find obvious. 
An existing vein of critical scholarship has already advocated for 
nonobviousness inquiries to focus more on economic factors or objective 
“secondary” criteria, such as long-felt but unsolved needs, the failure of others, 
and real-world evidence of how an invention was received in the marketplace.19  
Inventive machines may provide the impetus for such a shift. 
Nonobvious inquiries utilizing the Inventive Machine Standard might also 
focus on reproducibility, specifically whether standard machines could 
reproduce the subject matter of a patent application with sufficient ease.  This 
could be a more objective and determinate test that would allow the Patent Office 
to apply a single standard consistently, and it would result in fewer judicially 
invalidated patents.20  A nonobviousness inquiry focused on either secondary 
 
16. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 6–15 (2003) (critiquing Section 103 decisions). 
17. Cadogan Estates Ltd. v. Morris [1998] EWCA Civ. 1671 at 17 (Eng.) (referring to “the well 
known elephant test.  It is difficult to describe, but you know it when you see it”). 
18. 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). 
19. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1596 (2011) (arguing for an inducement standard); Tun-Jen Chiang, A 
Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 39, 42 (2008) (arguing 
that, “[a]n invention should receive a patent if the accrued benefits before independent 
invention outweigh the costs after independent invention”); Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, 
Self-Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 897 (2009); John F. Duffy, A Timing Approach to Patentability, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 343 (2008) (arguing for a timing approach to determining obviousness); Daralyn J. 
Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 989, 1004–07 (2008) (arguing for a greater reliance on secondary 
considerations); Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the Indeterminate 
Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 57, 62 
(2008) [hereinafter Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem] (arguing for nonobviousness to be 
based on “how probable the invention would have been for a person having ordinary skill in 
the art working on the problem that the invention solves”); Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty 
and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 19 (1992) (arguing that patents should 
be issued for inventions which appeared unlikely to succeed in advance). 
20. For decades, obviousness has been the most common issue in litigation to invalidate a 
patent, and the most common grounds for a finding of patent invalidity.  See John R. Allison 
& Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 
185, 208–09 (1998); John R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent 
Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1782, 1785 (2014).  As other commentators have noted, the 
bar here is low, and the new standard, “can be an administrative success if it is even just a bit 
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factors or reproducibility may avoid some of the difficulties inherent in applying 
a “cognitive” inventive machine standard. 
However the test is applied, the Inventive Machine Standard will 
dynamically raise the current benchmark for patentability.  Inventive machines 
will be significantly more intelligent than skilled persons and also capable of 
considering more prior art.  An Inventive Machine Standard would not prohibit 
patents, but it would make obtaining them substantially more difficult: A person 
or computer might need to have an unusual insight that other inventive 
machines could not easily recreate, developers might need to create increasingly 
intelligent computers that could outperform standard machines, or, most likely, 
invention will be dependent on specialized, non-public sources of data.  The 
nonobviousness bar will continue to rise as machines inevitably become 
increasingly sophisticated.  Taken to its logical extreme, and given there may be 
no limit to how intelligent computers will become, it may be that every invention 
will one day be obvious to commonly used computers.  That would mean no 
more patents should be issued without some radical change to current 
patentability criteria. 
This Article is structured in three parts.  Part I considers the current test for 
obviousness and its historical evolution.  It finds that obviousness is evaluated 
through the lens of the skilled person, who reflects the characteristics of the 
average worker in a field.21  The level of creativity and knowledge imputed to the 
skilled person is critical for the obviousness analysis.22  The more capable the skilled 
person, the more they will find obvious, and this will result in fewer issued patents. 
Part II considers the use of artificial intelligence in research and 
development (R&D) and proposes a novel framework for conceptualizing the 
transition from human to machine inventors.  Already, inventive machines are 
competing with human inventors, and human inventors are augmenting their 
 
better than current doctrine as a helpful theoretical and pragmatic guide for applying the 
obviousness doctrine.”  Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 19, at 1601. 
21. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Ryko Mfg. Co. v. 
Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The importance of resolving the level of 
ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness 
inquiry.”).  The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) provides guidance on the 
level of ordinary skill in the art.  MPEP § 2141.03. 
22. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1370 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“If the level of skill is low, for example that of a mere dyer, as Dystar has 
suggested, then it may be rational to assume that such an artisan would not think to combine 
references absent explicit direction in a prior art reference.”).  Though, in practice, few cases 
involve explicit factual determinations of the PHOSITA’s skill.  Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Obvious to Whom?  Evaluating Inventions From the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 885, 888 (2004).  See infra Subpart I.D for a discussion of the PHOSITA standard. 
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abilities with inventive machines.  In time, inventive machines or people using 
inventive machines will become the standard in a field, and eventually, machines 
will be responsible for most or all innovation.  As this occurs, the skilled person 
standard must evolve if it is to continue to reflect real-world conditions.  Failure 
to do this would “stifle, rather than promote, the progress of the useful arts.”23 
Part II then proposes a framework for implementing a proposed Inventive 
Machine Standard.  A decisionmaker would need to (1) determine the extent to 
which inventive machines are used in a field, (2) if inventive machines are the 
standard, characterize the inventive machine(s) that best represents the average 
worker, and (3) determine whether the machine(s) would find an invention 
obvious.  The decisionmaker is a patent examiner in the first instance,24 and 
potentially a judge or jury if the validity of a patent is at issue in trial.25  In both 
instances, this new test would involve new challenges. 
Finally, Part III provides examples of how the Inventive Machine Standard 
could work in practice, such as by focusing on reproducibility or secondary 
factors.  It then goes on to consider some of the implications of the new standard.  
Once the average worker is inventive, there may no longer be a need for patents 
to function as innovation incentives.  To the extent patents accomplish other 
goals such as promoting commercialization and disclosure of information or 
validating moral rights, other mechanisms may be found to accomplish these 
goals with fewer costs. 
Although this Article focuses on U.S. patent law, a similar framework exists 
in nearly every country.  Member States of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) are required to grant patents for inventions that “are new, involve an 
 
23. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 427. 
24. At the Patent Office, applications are initially considered by a patent examiner, and 
examiner decisions can be appealed to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).  U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Patent Trial and Appeal Board, https://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board-0 [https://perma.cc/3W42-FHH2].  
Also, the PTAB can adjudicate issues of patentability in certain proceedings such as inter 
partes review.  Id. 
25. Determinations of patent validity can involve mixed questions of law and fact.  Generally, in 
civil litigation, legal questions are determined by judges, while factual questions are for a 
jury.  See, e.g., Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 713 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (“Litigants have the right to have a case tried in a manner which ensures that factual 
questions are determined by the jury and the decisions on legal issues are made by the 
court . . . .”).  There are some exceptions to this rule.  See, e.g., Gen. Electro Music Corp. v. 
Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[I]ssues of fact underlying the 
issue of inequitable conduct are not jury questions, the issue being entirely equitable in 
nature.”).  See also Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid? (Stanford 
Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 2306152, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2306152. 
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inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”26  Although U.S. law 
uses the term “nonobvious” rather than “inventive step,” the criteria are 
substantively similar.27  For instance, the European Patent Office’s criteria for 
inventive step is similar to the U.S. criteria for obviousness, and also uses the 
theoretical device of the skilled person.28 
I. OBVIOUSNESS 
Part I investigates the current obviousness standard, its historical origins, 
and how the standard has changed over time.  It finds that obviousness depends 
on the creativity of the skilled person, as well as the prior art they consider.  These 
factors, in turn, vary according to the complexity of an invention and its field of 
art. 
A. Public Policy 
Patents are not intended to be granted for incremental inventions.29  Only 
inventions which represent a significant advance over existing technology 
should receive protection.30  That is because patents have significant costs: They 
limit competition, and they can inhibit future innovation by restricting the use 
 
26. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, 
33 I.L.M. 1197, 1208 [hereinafter TRIPS].  See Ryan B. Abbott, et al., The Price of Medicines 
in Jordan: The Cost of Trade-Based Intellectual Property, 9 J. GENERIC MEDS. 75, 76 (2012). 
27. TRIPS, supra note 26, at 1208 n.5.  Although, there are some substantive differences in the 
way these criteria are implemented, and TRIPS provides nations with various flexibilities for 
compliance.  See generally Ryan Abbott, Balancing Access and Innovation in India’s Shifting 
IP Regime, Remarks, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 341 (2014) [hereinafter Balancing Access]. 
28. “An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state 
of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.”  Convention on the Grant of 
European Patents art. 56, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M 268.  For guidance on the “skilled person” 
in European patent law, see Guidelines for Examinations, EUR. PAT. OFF., 
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/guidelines/e/g_vii_3.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XFY3-JD8J] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
29. The nonobviousness requirement is contained in Section 103 of the Patent Act: 
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the 
claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the 
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the 
claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing 
date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
which the claimed invention pertains. 
 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018). 
30. Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883) (noting that “[t]o grant to a single party 
monopoly of every slight advance made, except where the exercise of invention, somewhat 
above ordinary mechanical or engineering skill, is distinctly shown, is unjust in principle 
and injurious in its consequences”). 
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of patented technologies in research and development.31  To the extent that 
patents are justified, it is because they are thought to have more benefits than 
costs.  Patents can function as innovation incentives, promote the dissemination 
of information, encourage commercialization of technology, and validate moral 
rights.32 
Patents are granted for inventions that are new, nonobvious, and useful.33  
Of these three criteria, obviousness is the primary hurdle for most patent 
applications.34  Although other patentability criteria contribute to this function, 
the nonobviousness requirement is the primary test for distinguishing between 
significant innovations and trivial advances.35  Of course, it is one thing to 
express a desire to only protect meaningful scientific advances, and another to 
come up with a workable rule that applies across every area of technology. 
B. Early Attempts 
The modern obviousness standard has been the culmination of hundreds 
of years of struggle by the Patent Office, courts, and Congress to separate the 
wheat from the chaff.36  As Thomas Jefferson, the first administrator of the U.S. 
 
31. See I Think, supra note 1, at 1105–06 (discussing the costs and benefits of the patent system). 
32. Id. at 1105–08.  Congress’s power to grant patents is constitutional, and based on incentive 
theory: “To promote the progress of science . . . by securing for limited times to . . . inventors 
the exclusive right to their respective . . . discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  See Mark 
A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
129, 129 (2004) (“The standard justification for intellectual property is ex ante . . . .  It is the 
prospect of the intellectual property right that spurs creative incentives.”); see also United 
States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 316 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting “the 
reward to inventors is wholly secondary” to the reward to society); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 
(James Madison) (stating that social benefit arises from patents to inventors).  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has endorsed an economic inducement rationale in which patents should 
only be granted for inventions which would “not be disclosed or devised but for the 
inducement of a patent.”  This is the inducement theory articulated in Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10 (1966).  See also Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 20. 
33. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2018).  In the European system, these criteria are referred to as 
novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability.  Art. 52 EPC.  Inventions must also 
comprise patentable subject matter and be adequately disclosed.  35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 
(2018). 
34. DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.02[6] (2007); NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE 
CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 2:101 (J. Witherspoon ed., 1980).  Obviousness is the most 
commonly litigated issue of patent validity.  Allison & Lemley, supra note 20, at 208–09 
(1998). 
35. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102, 112 (2018). 
36. For that matter, the struggle dates back to the very first patent law, the Venetian Act of 1474, 
which stated that only “new and ingenious” inventions would be protected.  See Giulio 
Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450–1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166, 176–77 (1948); A. 
Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. 
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patent system and one of its chief architects, wrote, “I know well the difficulty of 
drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the 
embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not . . . I saw with 
what slow progress a system of general rules could be matured.”37 
The earliest patent laws focused on novelty and utility, although Jefferson 
did at one point suggest an “obviousness” requirement.38  The Patent Act of 1790 
was the first patent statute, and it required patentable inventions to be 
“sufficiently useful and important.”39  Three years later, a more comprehensive 
patent law was passed—the Patent Act of 1793.40  The new act did not require an 
invention to be “important,” but required it to be “new and useful.”41  The 1836 
Patent Act reinstated the requirement that an invention be “sufficiently used and 
important.”42 
In 1851, the Supreme Court adopted the progenitor of the skilled person 
and the obviousness test—an “invention” standard.43  Hotchkiss v. Greenwood 
 
U. L. REV. 1097, 1102–03 (1989); Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property From 
1545 to 1787, 26 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 711, 715 (1944). 
37. Letter to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1790–
1826, 175, 181 (Riker, Thorne & Co. 1854) [hereinafter Letter to Isaac McPherson]. 
38. In 1791, Jefferson proposed amending the 1790 Patent Act to prohibit patents on an 
invention if it “is so unimportant and obvious that it ought not be the subject of an exclusive 
right.”  5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 278, 1788–1792, (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 
G.P. Putnam & Sons 1895). 
39. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793). 
40. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (repealed 1836). 
41. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. at 318–23.  It also prohibited patents on certain minor 
improvements: “[S]imply changing the form or the proportions of any machine, or 
compositions of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a discovery.”  Id. at 321.  On this 
basis, Jefferson, who was credited with drafting most of this statute, argued that “[a] change 
of material should not give title to a patent.  As the making a ploughshare of cast rather than 
of wrought iron; a comb of iron, instead of horn or of ivory . . . .” Letter to Isaac McPherson, 
supra note 37, at 181. 
42. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117, 124 (repealed 1861). 
43. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (“We conclude that [§ 103] was 
intended merely as a codification of judicial precedents embracing the Hotchkiss condition, 
with congressional directions that inquiries into the obviousness of the subject matter 
sought to be patented are a prerequisite to patentability.”); see also S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 6 
(1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 7 (1952) (“Section 103 . . . provides a condition which 
exists in the law and has existed for more than 100 years.”).  Obviousness had been at issue 
in earlier cases, although not necessarily in such terms.  For instance, in Earle v. Sawyer, 
Justice Story rejected an argument by the defendant that the invention at issue was obvious, 
and that something more than novelty and utility was required for a patent.  8 F. Cas. 254, 
255 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1825).  He argued a court was not required to engage in a “mode of 
reasoning upon the metaphysical nature, or the abstract definition of an invention.”  Id.  
Justice Story further noted that English law permits the introducer of a foreign technology 
to receive a patent, and such an act could not require intellectual labor.  Id. at 256.  In Evans 
v. Eaton, the Supreme Court held that, a patent invention must involve a change in the 
“principle” of the machine rather than a change “merely in form and proportion.” 20 U.S. 
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concerned a patent for substituting clay or porcelain for a known door knob 
material such as metal or wood.44  The Court invalidated the patent, holding that 
“the improvement is the work of a skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.”45  
The Court also articulated a new legal standard for patentability: “Unless more 
ingenuity and skill . . . were required . . . than were possessed by an ordinary 
mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of 
skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention.”46 
However, the Court did not give specific guidance on what makes 
something inventive or the required level of inventiveness.  In subsequent years, 
the Court made several efforts to address these deficiencies, but with limited 
success.  As the Court stated in 1891, “[t]he truth is the word [invention] cannot 
be defined in such manner as to afford any substantial aid in determining 
whether any particular device involves an exercise of inventive faculty or not.”47  
Or as one commentator noted, “it was almost impossible for one to say with any 
degree of certainty that a particular patent was indeed valid.”48 
Around 1930, the Supreme Court, possibly influenced by a national 
antimonopoly sentiment, began implementing stricter criteria for determining 
the level of invention.49  This culminated in the widely disparaged “Flash of 
Genius” test articulated in Cuno Engineering v. Automatic Devices Corp.50  
Namely, that in order to receive a patent, “the new device must reveal the flash of 
creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling.”51  This test was interpreted to 
mean that an invention must come into the mind of an inventor as a result of 
 
(7 Wheat) 356, 361–62 (1822).  Writing for the Court, Justice Story noted the patent was 
invalid because it was “substantially the same in principle” as a prior invention.  Id. at 362. 
44. 52 U.S. 248, 265 (1850). 
45. Id. at 267. 
46. Id. 
47. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891).  Another court noted that “invention” is “as 
fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the paraphernalia of legal 
concepts.”  Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950). 
48. Gay Chin, The Statutory Standard of Invention: Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, 3 PAT. 
TRADEMARK & COPY. J. RES. & EDUC. 317, 318 (1959). 
49. See, e.g., Edward B. Gregg, Tracing the Concept of Patentable Invention, 13 VILL. L. REV. 98 
(1967). 
50. Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) (formalizing the 
test).  See, e.g., Hamilton Standard Propeller Co. v. Fay-Egan Mfg. Co., 101 F.2d 614, 
617 (6th Cir. 1939) (“The patentee did not display any flash of genius, inspiration or 
imagination . . . .”).  The Flash of Genius test was reaffirmed by the Court in 1950 in 
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
51. Cuno Eng’g Corp., 314 U.S. at 91. 
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“inventive genius”52 rather than as a “result of long toil and experimentation.”53  
The Court reasoned that “strict application of the test is necessary lest in the 
constant demand for new appliances the heavy hand of tribute be laid on each 
slight technological advance in the art.”54 
The Flash of Genius test was criticized for being vague and difficult to 
implement, and for involving subjective decisions about an inventor’s state of 
mind.55  It certainly made it substantially more difficult to obtain a patent.56  
Extensive criticism of perceived judicial hostility toward patents resulted in 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s creation of a National Patent Planning 
Commission to make recommendations for improving the patent system.57  The 
 
52. Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 357 (1875). 
53. The Supreme Court later claimed the “Flash of Creative Genius” language was just a 
rhetorical embellishment, and that requirement concerned only the device itself, not 
the manner of invention.  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 n.7, 16 n.8 (1966).  
That was not, however, how the test was interpreted.  See P.J. Federico, Origins of Section 
103, 5 APLA Q.J. 87, 97 n.5 (1977) (noting the test led to a higher standard of invention 
in the lower courts).  In Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 
U.S. 147 (1950), another case cited for the proposition that the Court had adopted stricter 
patentability criteria, the majority did not consider the question of inventiveness, but in his 
concurring opinion Justice Douglas reiterated the concept of “inventive genius”: “It is not 
enough that an article is new and useful.  The Constitution never sanctioned the patenting 
of gadgets.  Patents serve a higher end—the advancement of science.  An invention need not 
be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable.  But it has to be of such quality and 
distinction that that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an 
advance.”  Id. 
54. Cuno Eng’g Corp., 314 U.S. at 92. 
55. As a commentator at the time noted, “the standard of patentable invention represented by 
[the Flash of Genius doctrine] is apparently based upon the nature of the mental processes 
of the patentee-inventor by which he achieved the advancement in the art claimed in his 
patent, rather than solely upon the objective nature of the advancement itself.”  Comment, 
The “Flash of Genius” Standard of Patentable Invention, 13 FORDHAM L. REV. 84, 87 
(1944).  See Note, Patent Law—”Flash of Genius” Test for Invention Rejected, 5 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 144, 146 (1955); Stephen G. Kalinchak, Obviousness and the Doctrine of 
Equivalents in Patent Law: Striving for Objective Criteria, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 577, 586 
(1994); see also, Note, The Standard of Patentability—Judicial Interpretation of Section 
103 of the Patent Act Source, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 306, 306 (1963) [hereinafter The 
Standard of Patentability] (criticizing the standard). 
56. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson noted in a dissent that “the only patent that is valid is 
one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.”  Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton 
Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
57. See William Jarratt, U.S. National Patent Planning Commission, 153 NATURE 12 (1944); 
see also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING COMMISSION, NATIONAL PATENT 
PLANNING COMMISSION, at 6, 10 (1943). 
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Commission’s report recommended that Congress adopt a more objective and 
certain standard of obviousness.58  A decade later, Congress did.59 
C. The Nonobviousness Inquiry 
The Patent Act of 1952 established the modern patentability framework.60  
Among other changes to substantive patent law,61 “the central thrust of the 1952 
Act removed ‘unmeasurable’ inquiries into ‘inventiveness’ and instead supplied 
the nonobviousness requirement of Section 103.”62  Section 103 states: 
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the difference between the 
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that 
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time 
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
to which said subject matter pertains.  Patentability shall not be 
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.63 
 
58. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING COMMISSION, supra note 57,at 5–6.  “One 
of the greatest technical weaknesses of the patent system is the lack of a definitive yardstick 
as to what is invention.”  Id. at 26.  “The most serious weakness of the present patent system 
is the lack of a uniform test or standard for determining whether the particular contribution 
of an inventor merits the award of the patent grant.”  Id. at 14.  “It is proposed that Congress 
shall declare a national standard whereby patentability of an invention shall be determined 
by the objective test as to its advancement of the arts and sciences.”  Id. at 26. 
59. Though, Congress may not have realized what it was doing.  See George M. Sirilla, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103: From Hotchkiss to Hand to Rich, the Obvious Patent Law Hall-of-Famers, 32 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 509–14 (1999) (discussing the legislative history of the Patent Act of 
1952 and the lack of congressional awareness of, and intent for, Section 103). 
60. See The Standard of Patentability, supra note 55, at 309.  “[P]robably no other title 
incorporates the thinking of so many qualified technical men throughout the country as 
does this revision.”  L. James Harris, Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the 
Patent Act of 1952, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658, 661 (1955). 
61. “The major changes or innovations in the title consist of incorporating a requirement for 
invention in § 103 and the judicial doctrine of contributory infringement in § 271.”  H.R. 
REP. NO. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952). 
62. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, J., 
dissenting in part, concurring in part) (citing P.J. Federidco’s Commentary on the New 
Patent Act, reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE SOC’Y 161, 177 (1993)).  See also 
Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 225–26 (1976) (describing the shift from “an exercise of the 
inventive faculty” established in case law to a statutory test and stating that “it was only in 
1952 that Congress, in the interest of uniformity and definiteness, articulated the 
requirement in a statute, framing it as a requirement of ‘nonobviousness’” (internal 
quotation marks and footnote omitted)).  The official “Revision Notes” state § 103 is meant 
to be the basis for “holding . . . patents invalid by the courts[] on the ground of lack of 
invention.”  S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 18. 
63. 35 U.S.C. § 103, as amended by the America Invents Act.  Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018)).  The 
America Invents Act did not fundamentally change the nonobviousness inquiry but did 
16 66 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2019) 
 
Section 103 legislatively disavowed the Flash of Genius test, codified the 
sprawling judicial doctrine on “invention” into a single statutory test, and 
restructured the standard of obviousness in relation to a person having ordinary 
skill in the art.64  However, while Section 103 may be more objective and definite 
than the Flash of Genius test, the meanings of “obvious” and “a person having 
ordinary skill” were not defined, and in practice also proved “often difficult to 
apply.”65 
The Supreme Court first interpreted the statutory nonobviousness 
requirement in a trilogy of cases: Graham v. John Deere (1966) and its 
companion cases, Calmar v. Cook Chemical (1965) and United States v. Adams 
(1966).66  In these cases, the Court articulated a framework for evaluating 
obviousness as a question of law based on the following underlying factual 
inquiries: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) the level of ordinary skill 
in the prior art, (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior 
art, and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness.67  This framework remains 
applicable today.  Of note, the Graham analysis does not explain how to evaluate 
the ultimate legal question of nonobviousness, beyond identifying underlying 
factual considerations.68 
In 1984, the newly established United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, the only appellate-level court with jurisdiction to hear patent 
case appeals, devised the “teaching, suggestion, and motivation” (TSM) test for 
obviousness.69  Strictly applied, this test only permits an obviousness rejection 
when prior art explicitly teaches, suggests or motivates a combination of existing 
 
result in some modest changes.  https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2158.html 
[https://perma.cc/TAQ7-KMCC].   
64. See Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 393, 393–407 (1960);  
see also Chin, supra note 48, at 318.  In Graham, the Supreme Court noted that 
“[i]t . . . seems apparent that Congress intended by the last sentence of § 103 to abolish 
the test it believed this Court announced in the controversial phrase ‘flash of creative 
genius,’ used in Cuno Engineering.”  Graham, 383 U.S. at 15. 
65. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting the 
obviousness standard is easy to expound and “often difficult to apply”). 
66. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51–52 
(1966); Calmar v. Cook Chem., 380 U.S. 949 (1965). 
67. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.  With regards to the fourth category, considerations such as 
commercial success and long felt but unsolved needs can serve as evidence of nonobviousness 
in certain circumstances.  Id. 
68. See Joseph Miller, Nonobviousness: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, in 2 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE: PATENTS 
AND TRADE SECRETS 9 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (“[T]he Court did not indicate . . . how one was 
to go about determining obviousness (or not).”). 
69. Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-
court/court-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/TE4D-GRF2]. 
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elements into a new invention.70  The TSM test protects against hindsight bias 
because it requires an objective finding in the prior art.  In retrospect, it is easy 
for an invention to appear obvious by piecing together bits of prior art using the 
invention as a blueprint.71 
In KSR v. Teleflex (2006), the Supreme Court upheld the Graham analysis 
but rejected the Federal Circuit’s exclusive reliance on the TSM test.  The Court 
instead endorsed a flexible approach to obviousness in light of “[t]he diversity of 
inventive pursuits and of modern technology.”72  Rather than approving a single 
definitive test, the Court identified a nonexhaustive list of rationales to support a 
finding of obviousness.73  This remains the approach to obviousness today. 
D. Finding PHOSITA 
Determining the level of ordinary skill is critical to assessing obviousness.74  
The more sophisticated the person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA, 
or the skilled person), the more likely a new invention is to appear obvious.  
 
70. ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
71. See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
72. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402 (2007).  “[An obviousness] analysis need not 
seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for 
a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a [PHOSITA] would 
employ.”  Id. at 418. 
73. These post-KSR rationales include:  
 (A) Combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield 
predictable results; (B) Simple substitution of one known element for another 
to obtain predictable results; (C) Use of known technique to improve similar 
devices (methods, or products) in the same way; (D) Applying a known 
technique to a known device (method, or product) ready for improvement to 
yield predictable results; (E) ‘Obvious to try’—choosing from a finite number of 
identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success; (F) 
Known work in one field of endeavor may prompt variations of it for use in 
either the same field or a different one based on design incentives or other 
market forces if the variations are predictable to one of ordinary skill in the art; 
(G) Some teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that would have 
led one of ordinary skill to modify the prior art reference or to combine prior 
art reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention. 
 2141 Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103 [R-
08.2017], U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/ 
s2141.html [http://perma.cc/EE7P-4CQ9] [hereinafter 2141 Examination Guidelines]. 
74. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 666 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Ryko Mfg. Co., v. Nu-
Star, Inc.,950 F.2d 714 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The importance of resolving the level of 
ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness 
inquiry.”).  The skilled person is relevant to many areas of patent law, including claim 
construction, best mode, definiteness, enablement, and the doctrine of equivalents.  See 
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1155, 1186–87 (2002). 
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Thus, it matters a great deal whether the skilled person is a “moron in a hurry”75 
or the combined “masters of the scientific field in which an [invention] falls.”76 
The skilled person has never been precisely defined, although judicial 
guidance exists.77  In KSR, the Supreme Court described the skilled person as “a 
person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”78  The Federal Circuit has 
explained the skilled person is a hypothetical person, like the reasonable person 
in tort law,79 who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the 
invention.80  The skilled person is not a judge, amateur, person skilled in remote 
arts, or a set of “geniuses in the art at hand.”81  The skilled person is “one who 
thinks along the line of conventional wisdom in the art and is not one who 
undertakes to innovate.”82 
The Federal Circuit has provided a nonexhaustive list of factors to consider 
in determining the level of ordinary skill: (1) “type[s] of problems encountered 
in the art,” (2) “prior art solutions to those problems,” (3) “rapidity with which 
innovations are made,” (4) “sophistication of the technology,” and (5) 
“educational level of active workers in the field.”83  In any particular case, one or 
more factors may predominate, and not every factor may be relevant.84  The 
 
75. Morning Star Coop. Soc’y v. Express Newspapers Ltd. [1979] FSR 113 (marking the first use 
of the term “moron in a hurry” as a standard for trademark confusion). 
76. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155 (1950). 
77. See James B. Gambrell & John H. Dodge, II, Ordinary Skill in the Art—An Enemy of the 
Inventor or a Friend of the People?, in NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF 
PATENTABILITY 5:302 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980) (“[T]he Supreme Court in particular, 
but other courts as well, has done precious little to define the person of ordinary skill in the 
art.”). 
78. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).  The MPEP provides guidance on the 
level of ordinary skill in the art.  MPEP § 2141.03.  See John F. Duffy & Robert P. Merges, 
The Story of Graham v. John Deere Company: Patent Law’s Evolving Standard of Creativity, 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 110 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 
2006) (noting that determining the appropriate level of ordinary skill for the 
nonobviousness standard “is one of the most important policy issues in all of patent law”). 
79. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[T]he 
decision maker confronts a ghost, i.e., ‘a person having ordinary skill in the art,’ not unlike 
the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law.”). 
80. 2141 Examination Guidelines, supra note 73. 
81. Envtl. Designs Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
82. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
83. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
84. Id.; Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962–63 (Fed. Cir. 
1986).  Previously, this list of factors included the “educational level of the inventor.”  Envtl. 
Designs, Ltd.,713 F.2d at 696.  That was until the Federal Circuit announced that, “courts 
never have judged patentability by what the real inventor/applicant/patentee could or would 
do.”  Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  
Instead, “[r]eal inventors, as a class, vary in the capacities from ignorant geniuses to Nobel 
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skilled person standard thus varies according to the invention in question, its 
field of art, and researchers in the field.85  In the case of a simple invention in 
a field where most innovation is created by laypersons, such as, for instance, a 
device to keep flies away from horses, the skilled person may be someone with 
little education or practical experience.86  By contrast, where an invention is in a 
complex field with highly educated workers such as chemical engineering or 
pharmaceutical research, the skilled person may be quite sophisticated.87  At least 
in Europe, the skilled person may even be a team of individuals where 
collaborative approaches to research are the norm.88 
 
laureates; the courts have always applied a standard based on an imaginary work of their 
own devising whom they have equated with the inventor.”  Id. 
85. See, e.g., DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG, 464 F.3d 1356, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2006).  The court writes: 
If the level of skill is low, for example that of a mere dyer, as Dystar has 
suggested, then it may be rational to assume that such an artisan would not 
think to combine references absent explicit direction in a prior art 
reference. . . .  [If] the level of skill is that of a dyeing process designer, then one 
can assume comfortably that such an artisan will draw ideas from chemistry 
and systems engineering—without being told to do so. 
 Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc. concerned a patent for treating ear infections by applying 
an antibiotic to the ear.  501 F.3d 1254, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  The district court found that 
the skilled person “would have a medical degree, experience treating patients with ear 
infections, and knowledge of the pharmacology and use of antibiotics.”  Id.  “This person 
would be . . . a pediatrician or general practitioner—those doctors who are often the ‘first 
line of defense’ in treating ear infections and who, by virtue of their medical training, possess 
basic pharmacological knowledge.”  Id.  The Federal Circuit overturned this finding, 
holding that rather, a person of ordinary skill in the art was “a person engaged in developing 
new pharmaceuticals, formulations and treatment methods, or a specialist in ear treatments 
such as an otologist, otolaryngologist, or otorhinolaryngologist who also has training in 
pharmaceutical formulations.”  Id.  Courts have employed a flexible approach to 
considering informal education.  See, e.g., Penda Corp. v. United States., 29 Fed. Cl. 533, 565 
(1993).  For instance, in Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., the District Court found that keeping “up 
with current literature and trade magazines to keep abreast of new developments” could be 
the equivalent of “a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering, physics, mechanical 
engineering, or possibly acoustics.”  112 F. Supp. 2d 138, 155 (D. Mass. 2000). 
86. See Graham v. Gun-Munro, No. C-99-04064 CRB, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7110, at *19 (N.D. 
Cal. May 22, 2001) (holding that the skilled person had some formal education but no 
special training in the field of art in a case regarding fly wraps for the legs of horses). 
87. See Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 330, 371–72 (D. 
Del. 1991) (holding that the skilled person in the chemical industry is an organic chemist 
with a PhD); see also Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 697 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (noting the respective chemical expert witnesses of the parties with extensive 
backgrounds in sulfur chemistry were skilled persons). 
88. Guidelines for Examination, EUR. PAT. OFF., http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-
texts/html/guidelines/e/g_vii_3.htm [https://perma.cc/XFY3-JD8J] (“There may be 
instances where it is more appropriate to think in terms of a group of persons, e.g. a research 
or production team, rather than a single person.”).  See, e.g., MedImmune v. Novartis 
Pharm. U.K., Ltd., [2012] EWCA Civ. 1234 (evaluating obviousness from the perspective of 
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E. Analogous Prior Art 
Determining what constitutes prior art is also central to the obviousness 
inquiry.89  On some level, virtually all inventions involve a combination of 
known elements.90  The more prior art can be considered, the more likely an 
invention is to appear obvious.  To be considered for the purposes of 
obviousness, prior art must fall within the definition for anticipatory references 
under Section 102 and must additionally qualify as “analogous art.”91 
Section 102 contains the requirement for novelty in an invention, and it 
explicitly defines prior art.92  An extraordinarily broad amount of information 
qualifies as prior art, including any printed publication made available to the 
public prior to filing a patent application.93  Courts have long held that inventors 
are charged with constructive knowledge of all prior art.94  While no real inventor 
could have such knowledge,95 the social benefits of this rule are thought to 
outweigh its costs.96  Granting patents on existing inventions could prevent the 
 
a “skilled team”).  The “[P]atent is addressed to a team of scientists with differing 
backgrounds in areas such as immunology, in particular antibody structural biology, 
molecular biology and protein chemistry, but with a common interest in antibody 
engineering.”  Id.  In the United States, the idea that the skilled person could be a group of 
individuals has been discussed in academic literature, but may not have been explicitly 
adopted by the courts.  See, e.g., Jonathan J. Darrow. The Neglected Dimension of Patent 
Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 227, 244, 257 (2009).  A “skilled persons” 
standard would seem to be appropriate given that most patents are now filed with more than 
one inventor.  Dennis Crouch, PHOSITA: Not a Person—People Having Ordinary Skill in 
the Art, PATENTLY-O (June 7, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/06/phosita-not-a-
person-people-having-ordinary-skill-in-the-art.html [https://perma.cc/UAK2-5NT8] 
(noting that most patents have multiple inventors). 
89. This is the second inquiry of the Graham analysis described earlier. 
90. See, e.g., Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
91. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
92. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). 
93. Id. § 102(a)(1); see MPEP § 2152 for a detailed discussion of what constitutes prior art.  
Almost anything in writing is prior art.  “A U.S. patent on the lost wax casting technique was 
invalidated on the basis of Benvenuto Cellini’s 16th century autobiography which makes 
mention of a similar technique.”  See Michael Ebert, Superperson and the Prior Art, 67 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 657, 658 (1985). 
94. In Mast, Foos, & Co. v. Stover Manufacturing Co., the Supreme Court applied a presumption 
that the skilled person is charged with constructive knowledge of all prior art: “Having all 
these various devices before him, and whatever the facts may have been, he is chargeable 
with a knowledge of all preexisting devices.”  177 U.S. 485, 493 (1900) (emphasis added) 
(further, “we must presume the patentee was fully informed of everything which preceded 
him, whether such were the actual fact or not”). 
95. See, e.g., In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“[A]n inventor could not possibly 
be aware of every teaching in every art.”). 
96. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147–48 (1989) (reciting 
that Thomas Jefferson, the “driving force behind early federal patent policy,” believed that 
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public from using something it already had access to, and remove knowledge 
from the public domain.97 
For the purposes of obviousness, prior art under Section 102 must also 
qualify as analogous.  That is to say, the prior art must be in the field of an 
applicant’s endeavor, or reasonably pertinent to the problem with which 
the applicant was concerned.98  A real inventor would be expected to focus on 
this type of information.  The “analogous art” rule better reflects practical 
conditions, and it ameliorates the harshness of the definition of prior art for 
novelty given that prior art references may be combined for purposes of 
obviousness but not novelty.99  Consequently, for the purposes of obviousness, 
the skilled person is presumed to have knowledge of all prior art within the field 
of an invention, as well as prior art reasonably pertinent to the problem the 
invention solves.  Restricting the universe of prior art to analogous art lowers the 
bar to patentability.100 
 
“a grant of patent rights in an idea already disclosed to the public [i]s akin to an ex post facto 
law, ‘obstruct[ing] others in the use of what they possessed before’” (quoting Letter to Isaac 
McPherson, supra note 37, at 176)); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) 
(stating that granting patents on non-novel inventions would remove knowledge from the 
public domain). 
97. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6. 
98. See, e.g., Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Two criteria are 
relevant in determining whether prior art is analogous: ‘(1) whether the art is from the same 
field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within 
the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the 
particular problem with which the inventor is involved.’” (quoting Comaper Corp. v. Antec, 
Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).  “Under the correct analysis, any need or problem 
known in the field of endeavor at the time of the invention and addressed by the patent [or 
application at issue] can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner 
claimed.”  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007).  Prior art in other fields 
may sometimes be considered as well.  Id. at 417.  The general question is whether it would 
have been “reasonable” for the skilled person to consider a piece of prior art to solve their 
problem.  In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  To be “reasonably pertinent,” prior art 
must “logically [] have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his 
problem.”  Id. 
99. See In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“The rationale behind this rule 
precluding rejections based on combination of teachings of references from nonanalogous 
arts is the realization that an inventor could not possibly be aware of every teaching in every 
art.”).  The rule “attempt[s] to more closely approximate the reality of the circumstances 
surrounding the making of an invention by only presuming knowledge by the inventor of 
prior art in the field of his endeavor and in analogous arts.”  Id. 
100. See Margo A. Bagley, Internet Business Model Patents: Obvious by Analogy, 7 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 270 (2001) (arguing that prior to the analogous arts test 
references were rarely excluded as prior art); see also Jacob S. Sherkow, Negativing Invention, 
2011 BYU L. REV. 1091, 1094–95 (2011) (noting that once a relevant piece of prior art is 
classified as analogous, an obviousness finding is often inevitable). 
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The analogous art requirement was most famously conceptualized in the 
case of In re Winslow, in which the court explained a decisionmaker was to 
“picture the inventor as working in his shop with the prior art references—which 
he is presumed to know—hanging on the walls around him.”101  Or, as Judge 
Learned Hand presciently remarked, “the inventor must accept the position of a 
mythically omniscient worker in his chosen field.  As the arts proliferate with 
prodigious fecundity, his lot is an increasingly hard one.”102 
II. MACHINE INTELLIGENCE IN THE INVENTIVE PROCESS 
A. Automating and Augmenting Research 
Artificial intelligence (AI), which is to say a computer able to perform tasks 
normally requiring human intelligence, is playing an increasingly important role 
in innovation.103  For instance, IBM’s flagship AI system “Watson” is being used 
exploratively to conduct research in drug discovery, as well as clinically to 
analyze the genes of cancer patients and develop treatment plans.104  In drug 
discovery, Watson has already identified novel drug targets and new indications 
for existing drugs.105  In doing so, Watson may be generating patentable 
inventions either autonomously or collaboratively with human researchers.106  
In clinical practice, Watson is also automating a once human function.107  In fact, 
according to IBM, Watson can interpret a patient’s entire genome and prepare a 
clinically actionable report in ten minutes, a task which otherwise requires 
 
101. In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966). 
102. Merit Mfg. Co. v. Hero Mfg. Co., 185 F.2d 350, 352 (2d Cir. 1950). 
103. See, e.g., DATA SCI. ASS’N, OUTLOOK ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE ENTERPRISE 3, 6 
(2016), http://www.datascienceassn.org/sites/default/files/Outlook%20on%20Artificial% 
20Intelligence%20in%20the%20Enterprise%202016.pdf [hereinafter Outlook on AI] (a 
survey of 235 business executives conducted by the National Business Research Institute 
(NBRI) which found that 38 percent of enterprises were using AI technologies in 2016, and 
62 percent will likely use AI technologies by 2018). 
104. IBM Watson for Drug Discovery, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/watson/health/life-
sciences/drug-discovery [https://perma.cc/DQ4D-ZKJF]; IBM Watson for Genomics, IBM, 
https://www.ibm.com/watson/health/oncology-and-genomics/genomics 
[https://perma.cc/8XK7-S8DN]. 
105. Ying Chen et al., IBM Watson: How Cognitive Computing Can Be Applied to Big Data 
Challenges in Life Sciences Research, 38 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 688 (2016), 
https://www.medicalaffairs.org/app/uploads/2018/02/Chen_2016_IBM_Watson.pdf. 
106. See generally Hal the Inventor, supra note 3 (discussing the “hypothetical” example of an AI 
system being used in drug discovery to identify new drug targets and indications for existing 
drugs). 
107. Kazimierz O. Wrzeszczynski et al., Comparing Sequencing Assays and Human-Machine 
Analyses in Actionable Genomics for Glioblastoma, 3 NEUROLOGY GENETICS e164 (2017), 
http://ng.neurology.org/content/3/4/e164 [https://perma.cc/3LGH-TKPW]. 
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around 160 hours of work by a team of experts.108  A recent study by IBM found 
that Watson’s report outperformed the standard practice.109 
Watson is largely structured as an “expert system,” although Watson is not 
a single program or computer—the brand incorporates a variety of 
technologies.110  Here, Watson will be considered a single software program in 
the interests of simplicity.  Expert systems are one way of designing AI that solve 
problems in a specific domain of knowledge using logical rules derived from the 
knowledge of experts.  These were a major focus of AI research in the 1980s.111  
Expert system-based chess-playing programs HiTech and Deep Thought 
defeated chess masters in 1989, paving the way for another famous IBM 
computer, Deep Blue, to defeat world chess champion Garry Kasparov in 
1997.112  But Deep Blue had limited utility—it was solely designed to play chess.  
The machine was permanently retired after defeating Kasparov.113 
Google’s leading AI system DeepMind is an example of another sort of 
inventive machine.  DeepMind uses an artificial neural network, which 
essentially consists of many highly interconnected processing elements working 
together to solve specific problems.114  The design of neural networks is inspired 
by the way the human brain processes information.115  Like the human brain, 
neural networks can learn by example and from practice.116  Examples for neural 
networks come in the form of data, so more data means improved 
performance.117  This has led to data being described as the new oil of the twenty-
first century, and the fuel for machine learning.118  Developers may not be able to 
 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. See Richard Waters, Artificial Intelligence: Can Watson Save IBM?, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 5, 
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/dced8150-b300-11e5-8358-9a82b43f6b2f [https://perma.cc/ 
J3N6-QMP3]; see also Will Knight, IBM’s Watson Is Everywhere—But What Is It?, MIT 
TECH. REV, (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602744/ibms-watson-is-
everywhere-but-what-is-it [http://perma.cc/YK3Q-HRQB]. 
111. STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 22–23 
(2d ed. 2002) (1995). 
112. IBM’s 100 Icons of Progress: Deep Blue, IBM http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/ 
us/en/icons/deepblue/words [https://perma.cc/7SG3-UYST]. 
113. Id. 
114. KEVIN GURNEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO NEURAL NETWORKS 1–4 (1997).  The first neural 
network was built in 1951.  See, e.g., RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 111. 
115. See, e.g., Volodymyr Mnih et al., Human-Level Control Through Deep Reinforcement 
Learning, 518 NATURE 529, 529–33 (2015). 
116. See GURNEY, supra note 114, at 1–4. 
117. PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE LEARNING 
MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD xi (2015). 
118. See, e.g., Michael Palmer, Data Is the New Oil, ANA MARKETING MAESTROS (Nov. 3, 2006). 
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understand exactly how a neutral network processes data or generates a 
particular output. 
In 2016, DeepMind developed an algorithm known as AlphaGo which beat 
a world champion of the traditional Chinese board game Go, and then the 
world’s leading player in 2017.119  Go was the last traditional board game at which 
people had been able to outperform machines.120  AlphaGo’s feat was widely 
lauded in the artificial intelligence community because Go is exponentially more 
complicated than chess.121  Current computers cannot “solve” Go solely by using 
“brute force” computation to determine the optimal move to any potential 
configuration in advance.122  There are more possible board configurations in Go 
than there are atoms in the universe.123  Rather than being preprogrammed with 
a number of optimal Go moves, DeepMind used a general-purpose algorithm to 
interpret the game’s patterns.124  DeepMind is now working to beat human 
players at the popular video game StarCraft II.125 
AI like DeepMind is proving itself and training by playing games, but 
similar techniques can be applied to other challenges requiring recognition of 
complex patterns, long-term planning, and decisionmaking.126  DeepMind is 
already being applied to solve practical problems.  For instance, it has helped 
decrease cooling costs at company datacenters.127  DeepMind is working to 
 
119. David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go With Deep Neural Networks and Tree Search, 
529 NATURE 484, 484–89 (2016).  In 2015, DeepMind attained “human-level performance 
in video games” playing a series of class Atari 2600 games. Mnih et al., supra note 115, at 529. 
See also, Cade Metz, https://www.wired.com/2017/05/googles-alphago-continues-
dominance-second-win-china [https://perma.cc/WA9G-JUGK]. 
120. See Richard Haridy, 2017: The Year AI Beat Us at All Our Own Games, NEW ATLAS (Dec. 26. 
2017), https://newatlas.com/ai-2017-beating-humans-games/52741 [https://perma.cc/ 
AH2Y-6FFD]. 
121. Silver et al, supra note 119. 
122. Id.; cf. Cade Metz, One Genius’ Lonely Crusade to Teach a Computer Common Sense, WIRED 
(Mar. 24, 2016), [hereinafter Lonely Crusade] https://www.wired.com/2016/03/ doug-
lenat-artificial-intelligence-common-sense-engine [https://perma.cc/WN2G-5CU9] 
(arguing that brute force computation was part of AlphaGo’s functionality). 
123. 10170, or thereabouts.  Silver et al, supra note 119. 
124. Silver et al, supra note 119. 
125. Tom Simonite, Google’s AI Declares Galactic War on StarCraft, WIRED (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.wired.com/story/googles-ai-declares-galactic-war-on-starcraft- 
[http://perma.cc/3VZJ-XXJV].  Compared with Go, StarCraft is vastly more complex.  It 
involves high levels of strategic thinking and acting with imperfect information.  Id. 
126. Game playing has long been a proving ground for AI, as far back as what may have been the 
very first AI program in 1951.  See Jack Copeland, A Brief History of Computing, 
ALANTURING.NET (June 2000) http://www.alanturing.net/turing_archive/pages/Reference% 
20Articles/BriefHistofComp.html [https://perma.cc/82JN-UC93].  That program played 
checkers and was competitive with amateurs.  Id. 
127. See Simonite, supra note 125. 
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develop an algorithm to distinguish between healthy and cancerous tissues, and 
to evaluate eye scans to identify early signs of diseases leading to blindness.128  
The results of this research may well be patentable. 
Ultimately, the developers of DeepMind hope to create Artificial General 
Intelligence (AGI).129  Existing, “narrow” or specific AI (SAI) systems focus on 
discrete problems or work in specific domains.  For instance, “Watson for 
Genomics” can analyze a genome and provide a treatment plan, and “Chef 
Watson” can develop new food recipes by combining existing ingredients.  
However, Watson for Genomics cannot respond to open-ended patient queries 
about their symptoms.  Nor can Chef Watson run a kitchen.  New capabilities 
could be added to Watson to do these things, but Watson can only solve 
problems it has been programmed to solve.130  By contrast, AGI would be able to 
successfully perform any intellectual task a person could. 
AGI could even be set to the task of self-improvement, resulting in a 
continuously improving system that surpasses human intelligence—what 
philosopher Nick Bostrom has termed Artificial SuperIntelligence (ASI).131  
Such an outcome has been referred to as the intelligence explosion or the 
technological singularity.132  ASI could then innovate in all areas of technology, 
resulting in progress at an incomprehensible rate.  As the mathematician Irving 
John Good wrote in 1965, “the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention 
that man need ever make.”133 
 
128. Chris Baraniuk, Google’s DeepMind to Peek at NHS Eye Scans for Disease Analysis, BBC (July 
5, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36713308 [https://perma.cc/ WA6R-
RUX3]; Chris Baraniuk, Google DeepMind Targets NHS Head and Neck Cancer Treatment, 
BBC (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37230806 
[http://perma.cc/6GAN-7EAZ]. 
129. Solving Intelligence Through Research, DEEPMIND, https://deepmind.com/research 
[https://perma.cc/7TC2-49B8]. 
130. See, e.g., Lonely Crusade, supra note 122. 
131. See generally NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES (2014). 
132. See generally RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND 
BIOLOGY (2005). 
133. Irving John Good, Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine, 6 ADVANCES 
IN COMPUTERS 31, 33 (1965)  
 Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all 
the intellectual activities of any man however clever.  Since the design of 
machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could 
design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an 
‘intelligence explosion,’ and the intelligence of man would be left far 
behind. . . .  Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man 
need ever make . . . . 
 Id. at 32–33.  
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Experts are divided on when, and if, AGI will be developed.  Many industry 
leaders predict based on historical trends that AGI will occur within the next 
couple of decades.134  Others believe the magnitude of the challenge has been 
underestimated, and that AGI may not be developed in this century.135  In 2013, 
hundreds of AI experts were surveyed on their predictions for AGI 
development.136  On average, participants predicted a 10 percent likelihood that 
AGI would exist by 2022, a 50 percent likelihood it would exist by 2040, and a 90 
percent likelihood it would exist by 2075.137  In a similar survey, 42 percent of 
participants predicted AGI would exist by 2030, and an additional 25 percent 
predicted AGI by 2050.138  In addition, 10 percent of participants reported they 
believed ASI would develop within two years of AGI, and 75 percent predicted 
this would occur within 30 years.139  The weight of expert opinion thus holds 
artificial general intelligence and superintelligence will exist this century.  In the 
meantime, specific artificial intelligence is getting ever better at outcompeting 
people at specific tasks—including invention. 
B. Timeline to the Creative Singularity 
We are amid a transition from human to machine inventors.  The following 
five-phase framework illustrates this transition and divides the history and 
future of inventive AI into several stages. 
 
 
134. Pawel Sysiak, When Will the First Machine Become Superintelligent?, AI REVOLUTION, (Apr. 
11, 2016), https://medium.com/ai-revolution/when-will-the-first-machine-become-
superintelligent-ae5a6f128503 [https://perma.cc/7YUP-DEYM]. 
135. Id.  In fairness, history also reflects some overly optimistic predictions.  In 1970, Marvin 
Minsky, one of the most famous AI thought leaders, was quoted in Life Magazine as stating, 
“In from three to eight years we will have a machine with the general intelligence of an 
average human being.”  Brad Darrach, Meet Shaky, the First Electronic Person, LIFE, Nov. 20 
1970, at 58B, 66, 68. 
136. See Müller & Bostrom, supra note 7. 
137. Id.  Participants were asked to provide an optimistic year for AGI’s development (10 percent 
likelihood), a realistic year (50 percent likelihood), and a pessimistic year (90 percent likelihood).  
The median responses were 2022 as an optimistic year, 2040 as a realistic year, and 2075 as 
a pessimistic year.  Id. 
138. A survey conducted at an annual AGI Conference reported that 42 percent believed AGI 
would exist by 2030, 25 percent by 2050, 20 percent by 2100, 10 percent after 2010, and 2 
percent never.  See JAMES BARRAT, OUR FINAL INVENTION: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE 
END OF THE HUMAN ERA 152 (2013).  For instance, Demis Hassabis, the founder of 
DeepMind, believes AGI is still decades away.  David Rowan, DeepMind: Inside Google’s 
Super-Brain, WIRED (June 22, 2015), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/deepmind 
[https://perma.cc/MM6P-EU43]. 
139. See Müller & Bostrom, supra note 7. 
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Phase Inventors Skilled Standard Timeframe 
I Human Person Past 
II Human > SAI Augmented Person Present 
III Human ~ SAI 
Augmented Person ~ 
SAI 
Short Term 
IV 
SAI ~ AGI > 
Human 
Augmented AGI Medium Term 
V ASI ASI Long Term 
SAI = Specific Artificial Intelligence; AGI = Artificial General Intelligence; 
ASI = Artificial Superintelligence; ~ = competing; > = outcompeting 
Table 1: Evolution of Machine Invention 
 
Previously, in Phase I, all invention was created by people.  If a company 
wanted to solve an industrial problem, it asked a research scientist, or a team of 
research scientists, to solve the problem.  Phase I ended when the first patent was 
granted for an invention created by an autonomous machine—likely 1998 or 
earlier.140  It may be difficult to determine precisely when the first patent was 
issued for an autonomous machine invention, as there is no obligation to report 
the role of machines in patent applications.  Still, any number of patents have 
likely been issued to inventions autonomously generated by machines.141  In 
1998, a patent was issued for an invention autonomously developed by a neural 
network-based system known as the Creativity Machine.142 
 
140. Phase I might also be distinguished by the first time a machine invented anything 
independently of receiving a patent.  However, using the first granted patent application is 
a better benchmark.  It is an external measure of a certain threshold of creativity, and it 
represents the first time a computer automated the role of a patent inventor.  Of course, there 
is a degree of subjectivity in a patent examiner determining whether an invention is new, 
nonobvious, and useful.  What is nonobvious to one examiner may be obvious to another.  
See, e.g., Iain M. Cockburn et al., Are All Patent Examiners Equal?  The Impact of 
Characteristics on Patent Statistics and Litigation Outcomes, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-
BASED ECONOMY, (Wesley M. Cohen & Steven A. Merrill eds., 2003) (describing significant 
interexaminer variation). 
141. See generally, I Think, supra note 1, at 1083–91 (describing patents issued for 
“computational invention”). 
142. Id. at 1083–86. 
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Patents may have been granted on earlier machine inventions.  For 
instance, an article published in 1983 describes experiments with an AI program 
known as Eurisko, in which the program “invent[ed] new kinds of three-
dimensional microelectronic devices . . . novel designs and design rules have 
emerged.”143  Eurisko was an early, expert AI system for autonomously 
discovering new information.144  It was programmed to operate according to a 
series of rules known as heuristics, but it was able to discover new heuristics and 
use these to modify its own programming.145  To design new microchips, Eurisko 
was programmed with knowledge of basic microchips along with simple rules 
and evaluation criteria.146  It would then combine existing chip structures 
together to create new designs, or mutate existing entities.147  The new structure 
would then be evaluated for interest and either retained or discarded.148  Several 
references suggest a patent was granted for one of Eurisko’s chip designs in the 
mid–1980s.149   
Although, after investigating those references for this article, the references 
appear to refer to a patent application filed for the chip design by Stanford 
University in 1980 which the University abandoned for unknown reasons in 
1984.150  Thus, a patent was never issued.  Also, as with other publicly described 
 
143. Douglas B. Lenat et al., Heuristic Search for New Microcircuit Structures: An Application of 
Artificial Intelligence, 3 AI MAG. , 17, 17 (1982). 
144. Eurisko was created by Douglas Lenat as the successor to the Automated Mathematician 
(AM).  See generally Douglas B. Lenat & John Seely Brown, Why AM and EURISKO Appear 
to Work, 23 AI MAG., 269, 269–94 (1983).  AM was an “automatic programming system” 
that could modify its own computer code, relying on heuristics.  Id.  Eurisko was a 
subsequent iteration of the machine designed to additionally develop new heuristics and 
incorporate those into its function.  Id. 
145. See Douglas B. Lenat et al., supra note 143. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. See, e.g., RICHARD FORSYTH & CHRIS NAYLOR, THE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE IBM PC BASIC VERSION 2167 (1986); see also MARGARET A. BODEN, THE 
CREATIVE MIND: MYTHS AND MECHANISMS 228 (2004). 
150. U.S. provisional patent application SN 144,960, April 29, 1980.  Email From Katherine Ku, 
Dir. of Stanford Office of Tech. Licensing, to author (Jan. 17, 2018) (on file with author).  
Douglas Lenat, CEO of Cycorp, Inc., who wrote Eurisko and performed the above-
mentioned research, reported that this work was done “before the modern rage about 
patenting things . . . ” and that in his opinion Eurisko had independently created a number 
of patentable inventions.  See Telephone Interview With Douglas Lenat, CEO, Cycorp, Inc. 
(Jan. 12, 2018).  He further reported that after Eurisko came up with the chip design, 
Professor James Gibbons at Stanford successfully built a chip based on the machine’s design.  
Id.  This chip was the subject of a patent application by Stanford, but the application was 
abandoned in 1984.  U.S. provisional patent application SN 144,960, supra.  Prior to the 
present investigation, Stanford had purged its paper file for the application and so no longer 
had records reflecting the reason for the abandonment.  Email From Katherine Ku, supra.  
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instances of patent applications claiming the output of inventive machines, the 
patent application was filed on behalf of natural persons.151  In this case, they 
were the individuals who had built a physical chip based on Eurisko’s design.152 
In the present, Phase II, machines and people are competing and 
cooperating at inventive activity.  However, in all technological fields, human 
researchers are the norm and thus best represent the skilled person standard.  
While AI systems are inventing, it is unclear to what extent this is occurring: 
Inventive machine owners may not be disclosing the extent of such machines in 
the inventive process, due to concerns about patent eligibility or because 
companies generally restrict information about their organizational methods to 
maintain a competitive advantage.  This phase will reward early adopters of 
inventive machines which are able to outperform human inventors at solving 
specific problems, and whose output can exceed the skilled person standard.  In 
2006, for instance, NASA recruited an autonomously inventive machine to 
design an antenna that flew on NASA’s Space Technology 5 (ST5) mission.153 
While there may now only be a modest amount of autonomous154 machine 
invention, human inventors are being widely augmented by creative computers.  
For example, a person may design a new battery using a computer to perform 
calculations, search for information, or run simulations on new designs.  The 
computer does not meet inventorship criteria, but it does augment the 
capabilities of a researcher in the same way that human assistants can help reduce 
an invention to practice.  Depending on the industry researchers work in and the 
 
Incidentally, Dr. Lenat is now continuing to develop an expert system-based AI that can use 
logical deduction and inference reasoning based on “common sense knowledge,” as 
opposed to a system like Watson that recognizes patterns in very large datasets.  Id.  He also 
states that his current company has developed numerous patentable inventions, but that it 
has not filed for patent protection, because he believes that, at least with regards to software, 
the downside of patents providing competitors with a roadmap to copying patented 
technology exceeds the value of a limited term patent.  Id. 
151. See I Think, supra note 1, at 1083–91 (describing instances of “computational invention”). 
152. Email From Katherine Ku, supra note 150.  Whether the individual(s) designing a chip or 
building a chip would qualify as inventor(s) would depend on the specific facts of the case 
and who “conceived” of the invention.  See generally Hal the Inventor, supra note 3 
(discussing standards for inventorship). 
153. Gregory S. Hornby et al., Automated Antenna Design With Evolutionary Algorithms, AM. 
INST. AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS (2006), http://alglobus.net/NASAwork/papers/ 
Space2006Antenna.pdf. 
154. As the term is used here, autonomous machines are given goals to complete by users, but 
determine for themselves the means of completing those goals.  See Ryan Abbott, The 
Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 
(2018).  For example, a user could ask a computer to design a new battery with certain 
characteristics, and the computer could produce such a design without further human 
input.  In this case, the machine would be autonomously inventive and competing with 
human inventors. 
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problems they are trying to solve, researchers may rarely be unaided by 
computers.  The more sophisticated the computer, the more it may be able to 
augment the worker’s skills. 
Phase III, in the near future, will involve increased competition and 
cooperation between people and machines.  In certain industries, and for certain 
problems, inventive machines will become the norm.  For example, in the 
pharmaceutical industry, Watson is now identifying novel drug targets and new 
indications for existing drugs.  Soon, it may be the case that inventive machines 
are the primary means by which new uses for existing drugs are researched.  That 
is a predictable outcome, given the advantage machines have over people at 
recognizing patterns in very large datasets.  However, it may be that people still 
perform the majority of research related to new drug targets.  Where the 
standard varies within a broad field like drug discovery, this can be addressed by 
defining fields and problems narrowly, for instance according to the subclasses 
currently used by the Patent Office.155 
Perhaps twenty-five years from now—based on expert opinion—the 
introduction of AGI will usher in Phase IV.  Recall that AGI refers to artificial 
intelligence that can be applied generally, as opposed to narrowly in specific 
fields of art, and that it has intelligence comparable to a person.  AGI will 
compete with human inventors in every field, which makes AGI a natural 
substitute for the skilled person.  Even with this new standard, human inventors 
may continue to invent—just not as much.  An inventor may be a creative genius 
whose abilities exceed the human average, or a person of ordinary intelligence 
who has a groundbreaking insight. 
Just as SAI outperforms people in certain fields, it will likely be the case that 
SAI outperforms AGI in certain circumstances.  An example of this could be 
when screening a million compounds for pesticide function lends itself to a 
“brute force” computational approach.  For this reason, SAI could continue to 
represent the level of ordinary skill in fields in which SAI is the standard, while 
AGI could replace the skilled person in all other fields.  However, the two systems 
will likely be compatible.  A general AI system wanting to play Go could 
incorporate AlphaGo into its own programming, design its own algorithm like 
AlphaGo, or even instruct a second computer operating AlphaGo. 
AGI will change the human-machine dynamic in another way.  If the 
machine is genuinely capable of performing any intellectual task a person could, 
 
155. See generally, Overview of the U.S. Patent Classification System (U.S.P.C.), U.S. PAT & 
TRADEMARK OFF. (2012), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/resources/ 
classification/overview.pdf. 
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the machine would be capable of setting goals collaboratively with a person, or 
even by itself.  Instead of a person instructing a computer to screen a million 
compounds for pesticide function, a person could merely ask a computer to 
develop a new pesticide.  For that matter, an agrochemical company like Bayer 
could instruct DeepMind to develop any new technology for its business, or just 
to improve its profitability.  Such machines should not only be able to solve 
known problems, but also solve unknown problems. 
AGI will continually improve, transforming into ASI.  Ultimately, in Phase 
V, when AGI succeeds in developing artificial superintelligence, it will mean the 
end of obviousness.  Everything will be obvious to a sufficiently intelligent 
machine. 
C. Inventive and Skilled Machines 
For purposes of patent law, an inventive machine should be one which 
generates patentable output while meeting traditional inventorship criteria.156  
Because obviousness focuses on the quality of a patent application’s inventive 
content, it should be irrelevant whether the content comes from a person or 
machine, or a particular type of machine.  A machine which autonomously 
generates patentable output, or which does so collaboratively with human 
inventors where the machine meets joint inventorship criteria, is inventive. 
Under the present framework, inventive machines would not be the 
equivalent of hypothetical skilled machines, just as human inventors are not 
skilled persons.  In fact, it should not be possible to extrapolate about the 
characteristics of a skilled entity from information about inventive entities.  
Granted, the Federal Circuit once included the “educational level of the 
inventor” in its early factor-based test for the skilled person.157  However, that 
was only until it occurred to the Federal Circuit that:  
[C]ourts never have judged patentability by what the real 
inventor/applicant/patentee could or would do.  Real inventors, as 
a class, vary in the capacities from ignorant geniuses to Nobel 
laureates; the courts have always applied a standard based on an 
 
156. See I Think, supra note 1 (arguing computers which independently meet human 
inventorship criteria should be recognized as inventors). 
157. See e.g., Environmental, supra note 84. 
32 66 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2019) 
 
imaginary work of their own devising whom they have equated with 
the inventor.158 
What then conceptually is a skilled machine?  A machine that 
anthropomorphizes to the various descriptions courts have given for the skilled 
person?  Such a test might focus on the way a machine is designed or how it 
functions.  For instance, a skilled machine might be a conventional computer 
that operates according to fixed, logical rules, as opposed to a machine like 
DeepMind which can function unpredictably.  However, basing a rule on how a 
computer functions might not work for the same reason the Flash of Genius test 
failed: Even leaving aside the significant logistical problem of attempting to 
figure out how a computer is structured or how it generates particular output, 
patent law should be concerned with whether a machine is generating inventive 
output, not what is going on inside the machine.159  If a conventional computer 
and a neural network were both able to generate the same inventive output, there 
should be no reason to favor one over the other. 
Alternately, the test could focus on a machine’s capacity for creativity.  For 
example, Microsoft Excel plays a role in a significant amount of inventive 
activity, but it is not innovative.  It applies a known body of knowledge to solve 
problems with known solutions in a predictable fashion (for example, multiplying 
values together).  However, while Excel may sometimes solve problems that a 
person could not easily solve without the use of technology, it lacks the ability to 
engage in almost any inventive activity.160  Excel is not the equivalent of a skilled 
machine—it is an automaton incapable of ordinary creativity. 
Watson in clinical practice may be a better analogy for a skilled worker.  
Watson analyzes patients’ genomes and provides treatment 
recommendations.161  Yet as with Excel, this activity is not innovative.  The 
problem Watson is solving may be more complex than multiplying a series of 
numbers, but it has a known solution.  Watson is identifying known genetic 
mutations from a patient’s genome.  Watson is then suggesting known 
treatments based on existing medical literature.  Watson is not innovating 
 
158. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[The] 
hypothetical person is not the inventor, but an imaginary being possessing ‘ordinary skill in 
the art’ created by Congress to provide a standard of patentability.”). 
159. See I Think, supra note 1 (arguing against a subjective standard for computational 
invention). 
160. Some behaviors like correcting a rogue formula may have a functionally creative aspect, but 
this is a minimal amount that would not rise to the level of patent conception if performed 
by a person. 
161. See Wrzeszczynski et al., supra note 107. 
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because it is being applied to solve problems with known solutions, adhering to 
conventional wisdom. 
Unlike Excel, however, Watson could be inventive.  For instance, Watson 
could be given unpublished clinical data on patient genetics and actual drug 
responses and tasked with determining whether a drug works for a genetic 
mutation in a way that has not yet been recognized.  Traditionally, such findings 
have been patentable.  Watson may be situationally inventive depending on the 
problem it is solving. 
It may be difficult to identify an actual computer program now which has a 
“skilled” level of creativity.  To the extent a computer is creative, in the right 
circumstances, any degree of creativity might result in inventive output.  To be sure, 
this is similar to the skilled person.  A person of ordinary skill, or almost anyone, may 
have an inventive insight.  Characteristics can be imputed to a skilled person, but it is 
not possible the way the test is applied to identify an actual skilled person or to 
definitively say what she would have found obvious.  The skilled person test is simply 
a theoretical device for a decisionmaker. 
Assuming a useful characterization of a skilled machine, to determine that 
a skilled machine now represents the average worker in a field, decisionmakers 
would need information about the extent to which such machines are used.  
Obtaining this information may not be practical.  Patent applicants could be 
asked generally about the use and prevalence of computer software in their fields, 
but it would be unreasonable to expect applicants to already have, or to obtain, 
accurate information about general industry conditions.  The Patent Office, or 
another government agency, could attempt to proactively research the use of 
computers in different fields, but this would not be a workable solution.  Such 
efforts would be costly, the Patent Office lacks expertise in this activity, and its 
findings would inevitably lag behind rapidly changing conditions.  Ultimately, 
there may not be a reliable and low-cost source of information about skilled 
machines right now. 
D. Inventive Is the New Skilled 
Having inventive machines replace the skilled person may better 
correspond with real world conditions.  Right now, there are inherent limits to 
the number and capabilities of human workers.  The cost to train and recruit new 
researchers is significant, and there are a limited number of people with the 
ability to perform this work.  By contrast, inventive machines are software 
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programs which may be copied without additional cost.162  Once Watson 
outperforms the average industry researcher, IBM may be able to simply copy 
Watson and have it replace most of an existing workforce.  Copies of Watson 
could replace individual workers, or a single Watson could do the work of a large 
team of researchers. 
Indeed, as mentioned earlier, in a non-inventive setting, Watson can 
interpret a patient’s entire genome and prepare a clinically actionable report in 
ten minutes, as opposed to a team of human experts, which takes around one-
hundred and sixty hours.163  Once Watson is proven to produce better patient 
outcomes than the human team, it may be unethical to have people 
underperform a task which Watson can automate.  When that occurs, Watson 
should not only replace the human team at its current facility—it should replace 
every comparable human team.  Watson could similarly automate in an 
inventive capacity. 
Thus, inventive machines change the skilled paradigm because once they 
become the average worker, the average worker becomes inventive.  As the 
outputs of these inventive machines become routinized, however, they should 
no longer be inventive by definition.  The widespread use of these machines 
should raise the bar for obviousness, so that these machines no longer qualify as 
inventive but shift to become skilled machines—machines which now represent 
the average worker and are no longer capable of routine invention.164 
Regardless of the terminology, as machines continue to improve, the bar 
for nonobviousness should rise.  To generate patentable output, it may be 
necessary to use an advanced machine that can outperform standard machines, 
or a person or machine will need to have an unusual insight that standard 
machines cannot easily recreate.  Inventiveness might also depend on the data 
supplied to a machine, such that only certain data would result in inventive 
output.  Taken to its logical extreme, and given there is no limit to how 
sophisticated computers can become, it may be that everything will one day be 
obvious to commonly used computers. 
It is possible to generate reasonably low-cost and accurate information 
about the use of inventive machines.  The Patent Office should institute a 
requirement for patent applicants to disclose the role of computers in the 
 
162. ANDREAS KEMPER, VALUATION OF NETWORK EFFECTS IN SOFTWARE MARKETS: A COMPLEX 
NETWORKS APPROACH 37 (2010). 
163. See Wrzeszczynski et al., supra note 107. 
164. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1374 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“In view 
of the rapid advances in science, we recognize that what may be unpredictable at one point 
in time may become predictable at a later time.”). 
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inventive process.165  This disclosure could be structured along the lines of 
current inventorship disclosure.  Right now, applicants must disclose all patent 
inventors.166  Failure to do so can invalidate a patent or render it 
unenforceable.167  Similarly, applicants should have to disclose when a machine 
autonomously meets inventorship criteria. 
These disclosures would only apply to an individual invention.  However, 
the Patent Office could aggregate responses to see whether most inventors in a 
field (for example, a class or subclass) are human or machine.  These disclosures 
would have a minimal burden on applicants compared to existing disclosure 
requirements and the numerous procedural requirements of a patent 
application.  In addition to helping the Patent Office with determinations of 
nonobviousness, these disclosures would provide valuable information for 
purposes of attributing inventorship.168  It might also be used to develop 
appropriate innovation policies in other areas.169 
E. Skilled People Use Machines 
The current standard neglects to appropriately take into account the 
modern importance of machines in innovation.  Instead of now replacing the 
skilled person with the skilled machine, it would be less of a conceptual change, 
and administratively easier, to characterize the skilled person as an average 
worker facilitated by technology.  Recall the factor test for the skilled person 
includes: (1) “type[s] of problems encountered in the art,” (2) “prior art solutions 
to those problems,” (3) “rapidity with which innovations are made,” (4) 
“sophistication of the technology,” and (5) “educational level of active workers 
in the field.”170  This test could be amended to include, (6) “technologies used by 
 
165. It may also be beneficial for applicants to disclose the use of computers when they have been 
part of the inventive process but where their contributions have not risen to the level of 
inventorship.  Ideally, a detailed disclosure should be provided: Applicants should need to 
disclose the specific software used and the task it performed.  In most cases, this would be as 
simple as noting a program like Excel was used to perform calculations.  However, while this 
information would have value for policy making, it might involve a significant burden to 
patent applicants. 
166. Duty to Disclose Information Material to Patentability, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2001.html [https://perma.cc/4DE9-ZRWE]. 
167. See, e.g., Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fastener Corp., 607 F.3d 817, 829–30 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (upholding a district court decision to render a patent unenforceable on the 
grounds of inequitable conduct for misrepresenting inventorship). 
168. See I Think, supra note 1 (advocating for acknowledging machines as inventors). 
169. See Should Robots Pay Taxes?, supra note 6 (arguing the need to monitor automation for 
adjusting tax incentives). 
170. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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active workers.”  This would more explicitly take into account the fact that 
human researchers’ capabilities are augmented with computers. 
Moving forward in time, once the use of inventive machines is standard, 
instead of a skilled person being an inventive machine, the skilled person 
standard could incorporate the fact that technologies used by active workers 
includes inventive machines.  In future research, the standard practice may be 
for a worker to ask an inventive machine to solve a problem.  This could be 
conceptualized as the inventive machine doing the work, or the person doing the 
work using an inventive machine. 
Granted, in some instances, using an inventive machine may require 
significant skill, for instance, if the machine is only able to generate a certain 
output by virtue of being supplied with certain data.  Determining which data to 
provide a machine, and obtaining that data, may be a technical challenge.  Also, 
it may be the case that significant skill is required to formulate the precise 
problem to put to a machine.  In such instances, a person might have a claim to 
inventorship independent of the machine, or a claim to joint inventorship.  This 
is analogous to collaborative human invention where one person directs another 
to solve a problem.  Depending on details of their interaction, and who 
“conceived” of the invention, one person or the other may qualify as an inventor, 
or they may qualify as joint inventors.171  Generally, however, directing another 
party to solve a problem does not qualify for inventorship.172  Moreover, after the 
development of AGI, there may not be a person instructing a computer to solve 
a specific problem. 
Whether the future standard becomes an inventive machine or a skilled 
person using an inventive machine, the result will be the same: The average 
worker will be capable of inventive activity.  Replacing the skilled person with the 
inventive machine may be preferable doctrinally, because it emphasizes that it is 
the machine which is engaging in inventive activity, rather than the human 
worker. 
The changing use of machines also suggests a change to the scope of prior 
art.  The analogous art test was implemented because it is unrealistic to expect 
inventors to be familiar with anything more than the prior art in their field, and 
 
171. “[C]onception is established when the invention is made sufficiently clear to enable one 
skilled in the art to reduce it to practice without the exercise of extensive 
experimentation or the exercise of inventive skill.”  Hiatt v. Ziegler & Kilgour, 179 
U.S.P.Q. 757, 763 (Bd. Pat. Interferences 1973); see also Gunter v. Stream, 573 F.2d 77, 
79 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
172. Ex parte Smernoff, 215 U.S.P.Q. at 547 (“[O]ne who suggests an idea of a result to be 
accomplished, rather than the means of accomplishing it, is not a coinventor.”). 
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the prior art relevant to the problem they are trying to solve.173  However, a 
machine is capable of accessing a virtually unlimited amount of prior art.  
Advances in medicine, physics, or even culinary science may be relevant to 
solving a problem in electrical engineering.  Machine augmentation suggests 
that the analogous arts test should be modified or abolished once inventive 
machines are common, and that there should be no difference in prior art for 
purposes of novelty and obviousness.174  The scope of analogous prior art has 
consistently expanded in patent law jurisprudence, and this would complete that 
expansion.175 
F. The Evolving Standard 
The skilled person standard should be amended as follows: 
1) The test should now incorporate the fact that skilled persons are 
already augmented by machines.  This could be done by adding 
“technologies used by active workers” as a sixth factor to the 
Federal Circuit’s factor test for the skilled person. 
2) Once inventive machines become the standard means of research 
in a field, the skilled person should be an inventive machine when 
the standard approach to research in a field or with respect to a 
particular problem is to use an inventive machine. 
3) When and if artificial general intelligence is developed, inventive 
machines should become the skilled person in all areas, taking 
into account that artificial general intelligence may also be 
augmented by specific artificial intelligence. 
III. A POST-SKILLED WORLD 
This Part provides examples of how the Inventive Machine Standard could 
work in practice, such as by focusing on reproducibility or secondary factors.  It 
then goes on to consider some of the implications of the new standard.  Once the 
average worker is inventive, there may no longer be a need for patents to function 
 
173. In 1966, in Graham, the Court recognized that “the ambit of applicable art in given fields of 
science has widened by disciplines unheard of a half century ago . . . .  [T]hose persons 
granted the benefit of a patent monopoly [must] be charged with an awareness of these 
changed conditions.”  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966). 
174. See supra Subpart I.E. 
175. Innovative Scuba Concepts, Inc., v. Feder Indus., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1487, 1503 (D. Colo. 
1993) (discussing the expansion of analogous art); see also, e.g., George. J. Meyer Mfg. 
Co. v. San Marino Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1970) (discussing the 
expansion of analogous art). 
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as innovation incentives.  To the extent patents accomplish other goals such as 
promoting commercialization and disclosure of information or validating moral 
rights, other mechanisms may be found to accomplish these goals with fewer 
costs. 
A. Application 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp. concerned complex technology 
involving compounds known as Zeolites used in various industrial 
applications.176  Mobil had developed new compositions known as ZSM-5 
zeolites and a process for using these zeolites as catalysts in petroleum refining to 
help produce certain valuable compounds.  The company received patent 
protection for these zeolites and for the catalytic process.177  Mobil subsequently 
sued Amoco, which was using zeolites as catalysts in its own refining operations, 
alleging patent infringement.  Amoco counterclaimed seeking a declaration of 
noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability with respect to the two 
patents at issue.  The case involved complex scientific issues.  The three-week 
trial transcript exceeds 3300 pages, and more than 800 exhibits were admitted 
into evidence. 
One of the issues in the case was the level of ordinary skill.  An expert for 
Mobil testified that the skilled person would have “a bachelor’s degree in 
chemistry or engineering and two to three years of experience.”178  An expert for 
Amoco argued the skilled person would have a doctorate in chemistry and 
several years of experience.179  The District Court for the District of Delaware 
ultimately decided that the skilled person “should be someone with at least a 
Masters degree in chemistry or chemical engineering or its equivalent, [and] two 
or three years of experience working in the field.”180 
If a similar invention and subsequent fact pattern happened today, to apply 
the obviousness standard proposed in this Article a decisionmaker would need 
to: (1) determine the extent to which inventive technologies are used in the field, 
(2) characterize the inventive machine(s) that best represents the average worker 
if inventive machines are the standard, and (3) determine whether the 
machine(s) would find an invention obvious.  The decisionmaker is a patent 
 
176. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Amoco Chems. Corp.,779 F. Supp. 1429, 1442–43 (D. Del. 1991). 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 1443. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
Everything Is Obvious 39 
 
examiner in the first instance,181 and potentially a judge or jury in the event the 
validity of a patent is at issue in trial.182  For the first step, determining the extent 
to which inventive technologies are used in a field, evidence from disclosures to 
the Patent Office could be used.  That may be the best source of information for 
patent examiners, but evidence may also be available in the litigation context. 
Assume that today most petroleum researchers are human, and that if 
machines are autonomously inventive in this field, it is happening on a small 
scale.  Thus, the court would apply the skilled person standard.  However, the 
court would now also consider “technologies used by active workers.”  For 
instance, experts might testify that the average industry researcher has access to 
a computer like Watson.  They further testify that while Watson cannot 
autonomously develop a new catalyst, it can significantly assist an inventor.  The 
computer provides a researcher with a database containing detailed information 
about every catalyst used not only in petroleum research, but in all fields of 
scientific inquiry.  Once a human researcher creates a catalyst design, Watson 
can also test it for fitness together with a predetermined series of variations on 
any proposed design. 
The question for the court will thus be whether the hypothetical person 
who holds at least a Master’s degree in chemistry or chemical engineering or its 
equivalent, has two or three years of experience working in the field, and is using 
Watson, would find the invention obvious.  It may be obvious, for instance, if 
experts convincingly testify that the particular catalyst at issue were very closely 
related to an existing catalyst used outside of the petroleum industry in ammonia 
synthesis, that any variation was minor, and that a computer could do all the 
work of determining if it were fit for purpose.183  It might thus have been an 
obvious design to investigate, and it did not require undue experimentation in 
order to prove its effectiveness. 
Now imagine the same invention and fact pattern occurring approximately 
ten years into the future, at which point DeepMind, together with Watson and a 
competing host of AI systems, have been set to the task of developing new 
 
181. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 24 (at the Patent Office, applications are 
initially considered by a patent examiner, and examiner decisions can be appealed to the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)). 
182. Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents Are Valid? (Stanford Law Sch., Pub. Law 
& Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2306152, 2013), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2306152.  
183. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding 
that a “chemist of ordinary skill would have been motivated to select and then to modify a 
prior art compound (e.g., a lead compound) to arrive at a claimed compound with a 
reasonable expectation that the new compound would have similar or improved properties 
compared with the old”). 
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compounds to be used as catalysts in petroleum refining.  Experts testify that the 
standard practice is for a person to provide data to a computer like DeepMind, 
specify desired criteria (for example, activity, stability, perhaps even designing 
around existing patents), and ask the computer to develop a new catalyst.  From 
this interaction, the computer will produce a new design.  As most research in 
this field is now performed by inventive machines, a machine would be the 
standard for judging obviousness. 
The decisionmaker would then need to characterize the inventive 
machine(s).  It could be a hypothetical machine based on general capabilities of 
inventive machines, or a specific computer.  Using the standard of a hypothetical 
machine would be similar to using the skilled person test, but this test could be 
difficult to implement.  A decisionmaker would need to reason what the machine 
would have found obvious, perhaps with expert guidance.  It is already 
challenging for a person to predict what a hypothetical person would find 
obvious; it would be even more difficult to do so with a machine.  Computers 
may excel at tasks people find difficult (like multiplying a thousand different 
numbers together), but even supercomputers struggle with visual intuition, 
which is mastered by most toddlers. 
In contrast, using a specific computer should result in a more objective test.  
This computer might be the most commonly used computer in a field.  For 
instance, if DeepMind and Watson are the two most commonly used AI systems 
for research on petroleum catalysts, and DeepMind accounts for 35 percent of 
the market while Watson accounts for 20 percent, then DeepMind could 
represent the standard.  However, this potentially creates a problem—if 
DeepMind is the standard, then it would be more likely that DeepMind’s own 
inventions would appear obvious as opposed to the inventions of another 
machine.  This might give an unfair advantage to non-market leaders, simply 
because of their size. 
To avoid unfairness, the test could be based on more than one specific 
computer.  For instance, both DeepMind and Watson could be selected to 
represent the standard.  This test could be implemented in two different ways.  In 
the first case, if a patent application would be obvious to DeepMind or Watson, 
then the application would fail.  In the second case, the application would have 
to be obvious to both DeepMind and Watson to fail.  The first option would 
result in fewer patents being granted, with those patents presumably going 
mainly to disruptive inventive machines with limited market penetration, or to 
inventions made using specialized non-public data.  The second option would 
permit patents where a machine is able to outperform its competitors in some 
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material respect.  The second option could continue to reward advances in 
inventive machines, and therefore seems preferable. 
It may be that relatively few AI systems, such as DeepMind and Watson, 
end up dominating the research market in a field.  Alternately, many different 
machines may each occupy a small share of the market.  There is no need to limit 
the test to two computers.  To avoid discriminating on the basis of size, all 
inventive machines being routinely used in a field or to solve a particular 
problem might be considered.  However, allowing any machine to be considered 
could allow an underperforming machine to lower the standard, and too many 
machines might result in an unmanageable standard.  An arbitrary cutoff may 
be applied based on some percentage of market share.  That might still give some 
advantage to very small entities, but it should be a minor disparity. 
After characterizing the inventive machine(s), a decisionmaker would need 
to determine whether the inventive machine(s) would find an invention 
obvious.  This could broadly be accomplished in one of two ways: either with 
abstract knowledge of what the machines would find obvious, perhaps through 
expert testimony, or through querying the machines.  The former would be the 
more practical option.184  For example, a petroleum researcher experienced with 
DeepMind might be an expert, or a computer science expert in DeepMind and 
neural networks.  This inquiry could focus on reproducibility. 
Finally, a decisionmaker will have to go through a similar process if the 
same invention and fact pattern occurs twenty-five years from now, at which 
point artificial general intelligence has theoretically taken over in all fields of 
research.  AGI should have the ability to respond directly to queries about 
whether it finds an invention obvious.  Once AGI has taken over from the 
average researcher in all inventive fields, it may be widely enough available that 
the Patent Office could arrange to use it for obviousness queries.  In the litigation 
context, it may be available from opposing parties.  If courts cannot somehow 
access AGI, they may still have to rely on expert evidence. 
 
184. Alternatively, the machine could be asked to solve the problem at question and given the 
relevant prior art.  If the machine generates the substance of the patent, the invention would 
be considered obvious.  However, this would require a decisionmaker to have access to the 
inventive machine.  At the application stage, the Patent Office would need to contract with, 
say, Google to use DeepMind in such a fashion.  For that matter, the Patent Office might use 
DeepMind not only to decide whether inventions are obvious, but to automate the entire 
patent examination process.  At trial, if Google is party to a lawsuit, an opposing party might 
subpoena use of the computer.  However, if Google is not a party, it might be unreasonable 
to impose on Google for access to DeepMind. 
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B. Reproducibility 
Even if an inventive machine standard is the appropriate theoretical tool for 
nonobviousness, it still requires certain somewhat subjective limitations, and 
decisionmakers may still have difficulty with administration.  Still, the new 
standard only needs to be slightly better than the existing standard to be an 
administrative success. 
A test focused on reproducibility, based on the ability of the machine 
selected to represent the standard being able to independently reproduce the 
invention, offers some clear advantages over the current skilled person standard, 
which results in inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes.185  Courts have 
“provided almost no guidance concerning either what degree of ingenuity is 
necessary to meet the standard or how a decisionmaker is supposed to evaluate 
whether the differences between the invention and prior art meet this degree.”186  
This leaves decisionmakers in the unenviable position of trying to subjectively 
establish what another person would have found obvious.  Worse, this 
determination is to be made in hindsight with the benefit of a patent application.  
On top of that, judges and juries lack scientific expertise.187  In practice, 
decisionmakers may read a patent application, decide that they know 
 
185. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 16 (discussing objections to the skilled person 
standard). 
186. Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem, supra note 19, at 64. 
187. As Judge Learned Hand wrote: 
I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the law 
which makes it possible for a man without any knowledge of even the rudiments 
of chemistry to pass upon such questions as these.  The inordinate expense of 
time is the least of the resulting evils, for only a trained chemist is really capable 
of passing upon such facts . . . .  How long we shall continue to blunder along 
without the aid of unpartisan and authoritative scientific assistance in the 
administration of justice, no one knows; but all fair persons not 
conventionalized by provincial legal habits of mind ought, I should think, unite 
to effect some such advance. 
 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).  See also Safety Car 
Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 155 F.2d 937, 939 (1946) (“Courts, made up of 
laymen as they must be, are likely either to underrate, or to overrate, the difficulties in 
making new and profitable discoveries in fields with which they cannot be familiar . . . .”); 
see also Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of 
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 67 (2007) (“District Court judges are poorly equipped to read 
patent documents and construe technical patent claims.  Lay juries have no skill when it 
comes to evaluating competing testimony about the originality of a technical accomplishment.”). 
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obviousness when they see it, and then reason backward to justify their 
findings.188 
This is problematic because patents play a critical role in the development 
and commercialization of products, and patent holders and potential infringers 
should have a reasonable degree of certainty about whether patents are valid.  A 
more determinate standard would make it more likely the Patent Office would 
apply a single standard consistently and result in fewer judicially invalidated 
patents.  To the extent machine reproducibility is a more objective standard, this 
would seem to address many of the problems inherent in the current standard. 
On the other hand, reproducibility comes with its own baggage.  
Decisionmakers have difficulty imagining what another person would find 
obvious, and it would probably be even more difficult to imagine in the abstract 
what a machine could reproduce.  More evidence might need to be supplied in 
patent prosecution and during litigation, perhaps in the format of analyses 
performed by inventive machines, to demonstrate whether particular output 
was reproducible.  This might also result in a greater administrative burden. 
In some instances, reproducibility may be dependent on access to data.  A 
large health insurer might be able to use Watson to find new uses for existing 
drugs by giving Watson access to proprietary information on its millions of 
members.  Or, the insurer might license its data to drug discovery companies 
using Watson for this purpose.  Without that information, another inventive 
computer might not able to recreate Watson’s analysis. 
This too is analogous to the way data is used now in patent applications: 
Obviousness is viewed in light of the prior art, which does not include non-
public data relied upon in a patent application.  The rationale here is that this rule 
incentivizes research to produce and analyze new data.  Yet as machines become 
highly advanced, it is likely that the importance of proprietary data will decrease.  
More advanced machines may be able to do more with less. 
Finally, reproducibility would require limits.  For instance, a computer 
which generates semi-random output might eventually recreate the inventive 
concept of a patent application if it were given unlimited resources.  However, it 
would be unreasonable to base a test on what a computer would reproduce given, 
say, 7.5 million years.189  The precise limits that should be placed on 
 
188. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).  This was later 
recognized as a failed standard.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 47–48 (1973) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (obscenity cases similarly relying on the Elephant Test). 
189. This brings to mind a super intelligent artificial intelligence system, “Deep Thought,” which 
famously, and fictionally, took 7.5 million years to arrive at the “Answer to the Ultimate 
Question of Life, the Universe, and Everything.”  DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER’S 
GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 180 (rev. ed. 2001) (1979).  The answer was 42.  Id. at 188. 
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reproducibility might depend on the field in question, and what best reflected the 
actual use of inventive machines in research.  For instance, when asked to design 
a new catalyst in the petroleum industry, Watson might be given access to all 
prior art and publicly available data, and then given a day to generate output. 
C. An Economic vs. Cognitive Standard 
The skilled person standard received its share of criticism even before the 
arrival of inventive machines.190  The inquiry focuses on the degree of cognitive 
difficulty in conceiving an invention but fails to explain what it actually means 
for differences to be obvious to an average worker.  The approach lacks both a 
normative foundation and a clear application.191 
In Graham, the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion on nonobviousness, the 
Court attempted to supplement the test with more “objective” measures by 
looking to real-world evidence about how an invention was received in the 
marketplace.192  Rather than technological features, these “secondary” 
considerations focus on “economic and motivational” features, such as 
commercial success, unexpected results, long-felt but unsolved needs, and the 
failure of others.193  Since Graham, courts have also considered, among other 
 
190. See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 19, at 49 (as one commentator noted about the test as articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Graham, it gives “all the appearance of expecting a solution to 
appear out of thin air once the formula was followed.  The lack of an articulable rule meant 
that determinations of obviousness took the appearance—and arguably the reality—of 
resting on judicial whim . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 16, at 
1598; Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the 
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006) (discussing 
problems with hindsight in nonobviousness inquiries); Gregory N. Mandel, Another Missed 
Opportunity: The Supreme Court’s Failure to Define Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight 
Bias in KSR v. Teleflex, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323 (2008). 
191. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 16, at 1603 (“[N]either Graham nor in subsequent 
cases has the Supreme Court attempted either to reconcile the inducement standard with 
the statutory text or to provide a general theoretical or doctrinal foundation for the 
inducement standard.”). 
192. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17; MPEP § 2144. 
193. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17; MPEP § 2144.  Additional secondary considerations have since been 
proposed.  See, e.g., Andrew Blair-Stanek, Increased Market Power as a New Secondary 
Consideration in Patent Law, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 707 (2009) (arguing for whether an invention 
provides an inventor with market power); Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 16, at 1656 
(proposing changing commercial success to “unexpected commercial success,” adding as a 
consideration of the “cost of the experimentation leading to the invention,” and a few 
additional considerations). 
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things, patent licensing,194 professional approval,195 initial skepticism,196 near-
simultaneous invention,197 and copying.198  Today, while decisionmakers are 
required to consider secondary evidence when available, the importance of these 
factors varies significantly.199  Graham endorsed the use of secondary 
considerations, but their precise use and relative importance have never been 
made clear.200 
An existing vein of critical scholarship has advocated for adopting a more 
economic than cognitive nonobviousness inquiry, for example through greater 
reliance on secondary considerations.201  This would reduce the need for 
decisionmakers to try and make sense of complex technologies, and it could 
reduce hindsight bias.202   
Theoretically, in Graham, the Court articulated an inducement standard, 
which dictates that patents should only be granted to “those inventions which 
would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent.”203  But in 
practice, the inducement standard has been largely ignored due to concerns over 
application.204  For instance, few, if any, inventions would never be disclosed or 
devised given an unlimited time frame.  Patent incentives may not increase, so 
 
194. See, e.g., SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
195. See, e.g., Vulcan Eng’g Co. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
196. See, e.g., Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
197. See, e.g., Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
198. See, e.g., id. at 1377.  See also Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of 
Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1534–35 (2007). 
199. See MPEP § 2144; Durie & Lemley, supra note 19, at 996–97. 
200. See, e.g., Dorothy Whelan, A Critique of the Use of Secondary Considerations in Applying the 
Section 103 Nonobviousness Test for Patentability, 28 B.C. L. REV. 357 (1987). 
201. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 19, at  19 (arguing for patentability to be based on an a priori 
degree of uncertainty, that “rewards one who successfully invents when the uncertainty 
facing her prior to the invention makes it more likely than not that the invention won’t 
succeed” (emphasis omitted)); Chiang, supra note 19, at  42 (arguing for a utilitarian 
standard, such that “[a]n invention should receive a patent if the accrued benefits before 
independent invention outweigh the costs after independent invention”); Mandel, The Non-
Obvious Problem, supra note 19, at 62 (arguing for nonobviousness to be based on “how 
probable the invention would have been for a person having ordinary skill in the art working 
on the problem that the invention solves”); Durie & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1004–07 
(arguing for a greater reliance on secondary considerations); Duffy, supra note 19, at 343 
(arguing a timing approach to determining obviousness); Devlin & Sukhatme, supra note 
19; Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 16, at 1598 (arguing for an inducement standard). 
202. Graham, 383 U.S. at 36 (“[Secondary considerations] may also serve to ‘guard against 
slipping into use of hindsight.’” (citation omitted)).  See also HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ & 
ROBERT J. GOLDMAN, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 90–91 (6th ed. 2008). 
203. Graham, 383 U.S. at 11. 
204. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 16, at 1594–95. 
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much as accelerate, invention.205  This suggests that an inducement standard 
would at least need to be modified to include some threshold for the quantum of 
acceleration needed for patentability.  Too high a threshold would fail to provide 
adequate innovation incentives, but too low a threshold would be similarly 
problematic.  Just as inventions will be eventually disclosed without patents 
given enough time, patents on all inventions could marginally speed the 
disclosure of just about everything, but a trivial acceleration would not justify the 
costs of patents.  An inducement standard would thus require a somewhat 
arbitrary threshold in relation to how much patents should accelerate the 
disclosure of information, as well as a workable test to measure acceleration.206  
To be sure, an economic test based on the inducement standard would have 
challenges, but it might be an improvement over the current cognitive 
standard.207 
The widespread use of inventive machines may provide the impetus for an 
economic focus.  After inventive machines become the standard way that R&D 
is conducted in a field, courts could increase reliance on secondary factors.  For 
instance, patentability may depend on how costly it was to develop an invention, 
and the ex ante probability of success.208  There is no reason an inventive machine 
cannot be thought of, functionally, as an economically motivated rational actor.  
The test would raise the bar to patentability in fields where the cost of invention 
decreases over time due to inventive machines. 
D. Other Alternatives 
Courts may maintain the current skilled person standard and decline to 
consider the use of machines in obviousness determinations.  However, this 
means that as research is augmented and then automated by machines, the 
average worker will routinely generate patentable output.  The dangers of such a 
 
205. See, e.g., Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STATS. 348, 348 
(1968); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 444 
(2004). 
206. Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 16, at 1599 (proposing a “substantial period of time”). 
207. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 16, at 1663. 
208. Id. 
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standard for patentability are well-recognized.209  A low obviousness 
requirement can “stifle, rather than promote, the progress of the useful arts.”210 
Concerns already exist that the current bar to patentability is too low, and 
that a patent “anticommons” with excessive private property is resulting in 
“potential economic value . . . disappear[ing] into the ‘black hole’ of resource 
underutilization.”211  It is expensive for firms interested in making new products 
to determine whether patents cover a particular innovation, evaluate those 
patents, contact patent owners, and negotiate licenses.212  In many cases, patent 
owners may not wish to license their patents, even if they are non-practicing 
entities that do not manufacture products themselves.213  Firms that want to 
make a product may thus be unable to find and license all the rights they need to 
avoid infringing.  Adding to this morass, most patents turn out to be invalid or 
not infringed in litigation.214  Excessive patenting can thus slow innovation, 
destroy markets, and, in the case of patents on some essential medicines, even 
cost lives.215  Failing to raise the bar to patentability once the use of inventive 
machines is widespread would significantly exacerbate this anticommons effect. 
Instead of updating the skilled person standard, courts might determine 
that inventive machines are incapable of inventive activity, much as the U.S. 
Copyright Office has determined that nonhuman authors cannot generate 
copyrightable output.216  In this case, otherwise patentable inventions might not 
 
209. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 32–35, 75, 119–23, 145–49 (2004) (criticizing the Patent Office for granting 
patents on obvious inventions); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY 87–95 (2004) (criticizing lenient nonobviousness standards); Matthew Sag & 
Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 2 (2007) 
(“Academics, business leaders, and government officials have all expressed concern that too 
many patents are issued for [obvious] inventions.” ). 
210. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007). 
211. James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 
J.L. & ECON. 1, 2; accord DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (arguing for a heightened bar to patentability). 
212. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 25–26 (2008) 
(describing various costs associated with innovation in patent heavy industries). 
213. See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the 
Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425 (2014). 
214. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 80 (2005). 
215. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition From 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); see also MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK 
ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION AND COSTS 
LIVES (2008); see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation?  The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). 
216. This has been a policy of the Copyright Office since at least 1984.  See U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 306 (3d ed. 2014).  The 
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be eligible for patent protection, unless provisions were made for the inventor to 
be the first person to recognize the machine output as patentable.  However, this 
would not be a desirable outcome.  As I have argued elsewhere, providing 
intellectual property protection for computer-generated inventions would 
incentivize the development of inventive machines, which would ultimately 
result in additional invention.217  This is most consistent with the constitutional 
rationale for patent protection “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”218 
E. Incentives Without Patents? 
Today, there are strong incentives to develop inventive machines.  
Inventions by these machines have value independent of intellectual property 
protection, but they should also be eligible for patent protection.  People may 
apply as inventors for recognizing the inventive nature of a machine’s output,219 
or more ambitiously, inventive machines may be recognized as inventors, 
resulting in stronger and fairer incentives. 
Once inventive machines set the baseline for patentability, standard 
inventive machines, as well as people, should have difficulty obtaining patents.  
It is widely thought that setting a nonobviousness standard too high would 
reduce the incentives for innovators to invent and disclose.  Yet once inventive 
machines are normal, there should be less need for patent incentives.220  Once the 
 
Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices elaborates on the “human authorship” 
requirement by stating: “The term ‘authorship’ implies that, for a work to be copyrightable, 
it must owe its origin to a human being.”  Id.  It further elaborates on the phrase “[w]orks 
not originated by a human author” by stating: “In order to be entitled to copyright 
registration, a work must be the product of human authorship.  Works produced by 
mechanical processes or random selection without any contribution by a human author are 
not registrable.”  Id.  § 503.03(a). 
217. See generally I Think, supra note 1. 
218. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
219. Conception requires contemporaneous recognition and appreciation of the invention.  See 
Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that 
the inventor must have actually made the invention and understood the invention to have 
the features that comprise the inventive subject matter at issue); see also, e.g., Silvestri v. 
Grant, 496 F.2d 593, 597 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“[A]n accidental and unappreciated duplication 
of an invention does not defeat the patent right of one who, though later in time, was the 
first to recognize that which constitutes the inventive subject matter.”). 
220. See generally, Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity (Stanford Public Law, 
Working Paper No. 2413974, 2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2413974 (arguing new 
technologies that reduce costs will weaken the case for IP). 
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average worker is inventive, inventions will “occur in the ordinary course.”221  
Machine inventions will be self-sustaining.  In addition, the heightened bar 
might result in a technological arms race to create ever more intelligent 
computers capable of outdoing the standard.  That would be a desirable outcome 
in terms of incentivizing innovation. 
Even after the widespread use of inventive machines, patents may still be 
desirable.  For instance, patents may be needed in the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industries to commercialize new technologies.  The biopharma 
industry claims that new drug approvals cost around 2.2 billion dollars and take 
an average of eight years.222  This cost is largely due to resource intensive clinical 
trials required to prove safety and efficacy.  Once a drug is approved, it is often 
relatively easy for another company to recreate the approved drug.  Patents thus 
incentivize the necessary levels of investment to commercialize a product given 
that patent holders can charge monopoly prices for their approved products 
during the term of a patent. 
Yet patents are not the only means of promoting product 
commercialization.  Newly approved drugs and biologics, for example, receive a 
period of market exclusivity during which time no other party can sell a generic 
or biosimilar version of the product.  Newly approved biologics, for instance, 
receive a twelve-year exclusivity period in the United States.  Because of the 
length of time it takes to get a new biologic approved, the market exclusivity 
period may exceed the term of any patent an originator company has on its 
product.  A heightened bar to patentability may lead to greater reliance on 
alternative forms of intellectual property protection such as market exclusivity, 
prizes, grants, or tax incentives.223 
With regards to disclosure, without the ability to receive patent protection, 
owners of inventive machines may choose not to disclose their discoveries and 
rely on trade secret protection.  However, with an accelerated rate of 
technological progress, intellectual property holders would run a significant risk 
that their inventions would be independently recreated by inventive machines. 
Depending on the type of innovation, industry, and competitive landscape, 
business ventures may be successful without patents, and patent protection is 
 
221. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402 (2007). 
222. Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry G. Grabowski, & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. OF HEALTH ECON. 20–33 (2016). 
223. See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013) (describing various nontraditional intellectual property 
incentives). 
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not sought for all potentially patentable inventions.224  In fact, “few industries 
consider patents essential.”225  For instance, patents are often considered a 
critical part of biotechnology corporate strategy, but often ignored in the 
software industry.226  On the whole, a relatively small percentage of firms patent, 
even among firms conducting R&D.227  Most companies do not consider patents 
crucial to business success.228  Other types of intellectual property such as 
trademark, copyright, and trade secret protection, combined with “alternative” 
mechanisms such as first mover advantage and design complexity may protect 
innovation even in the absence of patents.229 
F. A Changing Innovation Landscape 
Inventive machines may result in further consolidation of wealth and 
intellectual property in the hands of large corporations like Google and IBM.  
Large enterprises may be the most likely developers of inventive machines due 
to their high development costs.230  A counterbalance to additional wealth 
disparity could be broad societal gains.  The public would stand to gain access to 
a tremendous amount of innovation—innovation which might be significantly 
delayed or never come about without inventive machines.  In fact, concerns 
about industry consolidation are another basis for revising the obviousness 
inquiry.  The widespread use of inventive machines may be inevitable, but 
raising the bar to patentability would make it so that inventions which would 
 
224. BRONWYN HALL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, THE USE OF ALTERNATIVES TO 
PATENTS AND LIMITS TO INCENTIVES, 2 (2012), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
20140603121456/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-patalternative.pdf; see also, Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?  Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the 
Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437, 1439 (2010); see also David 
Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing Roller Derby 
Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1094, 1146 (2012) (describing norm-based protections that 
function effectively in the absence of traditional IP).  Patent holders are only successful in 
about a quarter of cases that are litigated to a final disposition and appealed.  Paul M. Janicke 
& LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 8 (2006).  Fewer than 
two percent of patents are ever litigated, and only about 0.1 percent go to trial.  Lemley & 
Shapiro, supra note 214, at 79.  In cases where the validity of a patent is challenged, about 
half of the time the patent is invalidated.  Allison & Lemley, supra note 20, at 205 (1998). 
225. Merges, supra note 19, at 19. 
226. See generally, Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 214. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. See Jamie Carter, The Most Powerful Supercomputers in the World—and What They Do, 
TECHRADAR (Dec. 13, 2014), http://www.techradar.com/us/news/computing/the-most-
powerfulsupercomputers-in-the-world-and-what-they-do-1276865 (noting that most 
advanced computer systems are owned by governments and large businesses). 
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naturally occur would be less likely to receive protection.  To the extent market 
abuses such as price gouging and supply shortages are a concern, protections are, 
at least theoretically, built into patent law to protect consumers against such 
problems.231  For example, the government could exercise its march in rights or 
issue compulsory licenses.232 
Inventive machines may ultimately automate knowledge work and render 
human researchers redundant.  While past technological advances have resulted 
in increased rather than decreased employment, the technological advances of 
the near future may be different.233  There will be fewer limits to what machines 
will be able to do, and greater access to machines.  Automation should generate 
innovation with net societal gains, but it may also contribute to unemployment, 
financial disparities, and decreased social mobility.234  It is important that 
policymakers act to ensure that automation benefits everyone, for instance by 
investing in retraining and social benefits for workers rendered technologically 
unemployed.235  Ultimately, patent law alone will not determine whether 
automation occurs.  Even without the ability to receive patent protection, once 
inventive machines are significantly more efficient than human researchers, they 
will replace people. 
CONCLUSION 
Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.236 
 
In the past, patent law has reacted slowly to technological change.  For 
instance, it was not until 2013 that the Supreme Court decided human genes 
should be unpatentable.237  By then, the Patent Office had been granting patents 
on human genes for decades,238 and more than 50,000 gene-related patents had 
been issued.239 
 
231. See Balancing Access, supra note 27 (discussing patent law protections against practices 
including “evergreening”). 
232. See id. at 345 (explaining India’s issuance of a compulsory license). 
233. See Should Robots Pay Taxes?, supra note 6; see supra Part I. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
236. ARTHUR K. ELLIS, TEACHING AND LEARNING ELEMENTARY SOCIAL STUDIES 56, (1970) 
(quoting physicist Niels Bohr). 
237. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
238. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,447,538 (filed Feb. 5, 1982) (a patent issued in 1984 which claims 
the human Chorionic Somatomammotropin gene). 
239. Robert Cook-Deegan & Christopher Heaney, Patents in Genomics and Human Genetics, 11 
ANN. REV. OF GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 383, 384 (2010) (“In April 2009, the U.S. Patent 
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Eminent technologists now predict that artificial intelligence is going to 
revolutionize the way innovation occurs in the near to medium term.  Much of 
what we know about intellectual property law, while it might not be wrong, has 
not been adapted to where we are headed.  The principles that guide patent law 
need to be, if not rethought, then at least retooled in respect of inventive 
machines.  We should be asking what our goals are for these new technologies, 
what we want our world to look like, and how the law can help make it so.  
 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted the 50,000th U.S. patent that entered the DNA 
Patent Database at Georgetown University.  That database includes patents that make 
claims mentioning terms specific to nucleic acids (e.g., DNA, RNA, nucleotide, plasmid, 
etc.).”). 
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